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Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion
ZACHARY D. CLOPTON*
The American class action is a procedural tool that advances substantive law
values such as deterrence, compensation, and fairness. Opt-out class actions in
particular achieve these goals by aggregating claims not only of active participants
but also passive plaintiffs. Full faith and credit then extends the preclusive effect of
class judgments to other U.S. courts. But there is no international full faith and credit
obligation, and many foreign courts will not treat U.S. class judgments as binding
on passive plaintiffs. Therefore, some plaintiffs may be able to wait until the U.S.
class action is resolved before either joining the U.S. suit (and reaping its rewards)
or relitigating the case abroad. Transnational class actions thus give some plaintiffs
“litigation options.”
The few courts and scholars that have recognized this phenomenon have proposed
methods to identify litigation option holders and exclude them from opt-out
treatment. Some U.S. judges, for example, have refused to certify classes that include
citizens of foreign countries that may not recognize U.S. class judgments. This Article
shows that this conventional wisdom is misdirected: citizenship is the wrong
measure, courts are poorly positioned to identify relitigation risks, and the social
costs of excluding option holders may well outweigh the benefits. Instead, courts
should certify classes of foreign and domestic plaintiffs in service of policy goals
such as deterrence and intraclass fairness regardless of foreign preclusion law. At
the same time, this Article suggests innovative approaches to achieve some
preclusion previously unremarked upon in transnational cases. Prior approaches
are insufficient, in part, because they rely on courts without acknowledging the
informational asymmetries between courts and parties or the limited tools available
for judicial resolution. This Article explains how private incentives and private
information may fill the gap in interjurisdictional preclusion law. Parties should be
encouraged to negotiate private preclusion agreements in cases in which preclusion
matters. In addition, courts can coordinate informally to curb costly relitigation.
In summary, this Article uses values derived from lawmaking choices and a
practical assessment of the litigation environment to respond to litigation options in
transnational class actions not by excluding option holders but instead by permitting
aggregation and seeking alternatives to preclusion law. This Article applies these
lessons to transnational class actions filed in a single jurisdiction (e.g., a U.S. court),
as well as to dueling class actions filed in two countries simultaneously and to U.S.
recognition of foreign aggregate judgments whatever their form.
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INTRODUCTION
Transnational class actions are class actions, likely involving plaintiffs from
multiple nations, that may be filed in the courts of more than one country.1
Transnational class actions address topics from human rights to consumer protection
to securities law.2 To give one example, in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., a New
York federal court considered a putative class action arising out of the Bernard
Madoff scandal that comprised investors from more than thirty countries.3
At first glance, the party structure of Anwar would seem unremarkable. The
Madoff scandal touched investors across the globe, American courts are open to
foreign litigants, and nothing inherent in the class action should limit it to U.S.
citizens. Transnational class actions, if not routine, are at least not unexpected in a
global economy. But the court in Anwar was dubious. Relying on a line of cases
stretching back to Judge Henry Friendly,4 the court expressed concern about some of
the foreign class members. The judge noted that U.S. class judgments are not
uniformly enforceable around the world—there is no international law of
preclusion,5 and many foreign courts will not treat class judgments as binding on
passive plaintiffs.6 The result is an asymmetry between defendants bound by a

1. For the implications of this definition, see infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part I.
3. 289 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds by St.
Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014).
For a helpful catalog of Madoff litigation in medias res, see James R. Carroll, Matthew M.K.
Stein & Abra C. Bron, A March 2011 Update on the Madoff Litigation, 2011 ALI-ABA
COURSE STUDY CONF. ON INS. & FIN. SERVICES LITIG. 91.
4. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated as stated
in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
5. Preclusion refers to the effect of prior adjudication in future proceedings. It includes
the concepts of claim preclusion (merger and bar) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 3 (1982).
6. “Passive plaintiffs” refers to plaintiffs in opt-out class actions who neither
affirmatively opt out nor affirmatively opt in. The Appendix to this Article provides
summaries of foreign-aggregation procedures and foreign-court recognition of U.S. class
judgments, derived from scholarly treatments and court decisions. It also catalogs sources for
further study. See Zachary D. Clopton, Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of
Preclusion: Appendix Only, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2609339 (last
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judgment versus some passive plaintiffs with the option to bring a new suit in a
foreign forum if they are unsatisfied with the first result. Some passive plaintiffs in
transnational class actions thus possess “litigation options.”7
Uncomfortable with the asymmetry of litigation options, the Anwar court received
testimony about which foreign courts were likely to give preclusive effect to a U.S.
class judgment and then sorted plaintiffs on this basis. The court certified a class of
plaintiffs from the United States, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, and Finland, but excluded from class treatment putative class members from
Germany, Israel, Kuwait, Korea, North Korea, Pitcairn,8 Tokelau,9 Mongolia, China,
Liechtenstein, Japan, Oman, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Bosnia, Andorra, San Marino, Namibia, Monaco, and South Africa.10
The conventional wisdom, to the extent it exists, rejects litigation options and the
asymmetric risk of relitigation they represent. The Anwar decision is one example of
this thinking. Judge Friendly, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., offered perhaps the
earliest version of this approach to transnational class actions, declaring that “if
defendants prevail against a class they are entitled to a victory no less broad than a
defeat would have been.”11 In Anwar, Bersch, and many cases in between,12 courts
have sought to identify foreign plaintiffs with litigation options and deny them
opt-out class treatment. The scholarly consensus in this area, though perhaps more
nuanced, accepts this general approach.13
The aim of this Article is to show that the judicial and scholarly consensus is
wrong. It is wrong because it does not account for certain important features of
transnational litigation. And it is wrong because the costs of litigation options are

updated June 2, 2015).
7. This Article uses “litigation options” both to reflect the everyday meaning of “option”
as well as to make an analogy to financial options. For further explanation, see infra Part I. As
noted below, Professors Ratliff and Nagareda identified related options in U.S. civil procedure.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
8.
The Pitcairn Islands group is a British Overseas Territory. It comprises the
islands of Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno. Pitcairn, the only inhabited
island, is a small volcanic outcrop situated in the South Pacific . . . . With a
population of only around fifty, the people of Pitcairn are descended from the
mutineers of HMAV Bounty and their Tahitian companions. Pitcairn Island is
approximately 3.2km (2 miles) long and 1.6km (1 mile) wide with the capital
Adamstown located above Bounty Bay and accessed by the aptly named road,
“The Hill of Difficulty.”
GOV’T PITCAIRN ISLANDS, http://www.government.pn.
9. Tokelau consists of three atolls in the South Pacific and has a population of fewer than
two thousand. See About Us, GOV’T TOKELAU, http://www.tokelau.org.nz/About+Us.html.
10. Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated
and remanded on other grounds by St. Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers
Accountants N.V., 570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014).
11. 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated as stated in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse
Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
12. See infra notes 49–62 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 63–70 and accompanying text.
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overstated and the benefits of keeping transnational classes together are
underappreciated.
Litigation options present inherent and instrumental problems—inherently,
fairness seems to require equal stakes, and instrumentally, equal stakes promote
accurate outcomes. But these problems must be viewed against a clear-eyed
assessment of the litigation environment: crude measures like citizenship do not
explain when relitigation is permissible or likely, courts may have poor information
about when relitigation may happen, the threat of foreign relitigation is likely
overstated, and the costs of excluding option holders (e.g., to deterrence) may be
significant. For these reasons, the mere presence of litigation options should not be
a bar to class certification.
Importantly, though, certifying option holders means that relitigation may be
possible. By focusing on the certification decision, current approaches have
overlooked other opportunities to curb relitigation. Private approaches may achieve
additional preclusion by channeling private information and incentives, without
sacrificing the policy objectives furthered by aggregation. Interjurisdictional judicial
coordination can harness private incentives to turn the challenge of dueling class
actions into a response to litigation options.14
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I expands on the concept of litigation
options with a focus on transnational class actions. This Part also highlights the
limited scholarly and judicial attention paid to this concept to date, showing a
consensus that asks courts to deny certification to certain foreign citizens. Part II
offers a new strategy for aggregation in transnational class actions. Subpart A
explains why the exclusion of option holders is misguided, both in its execution and
its reliance on judicial competence. With this assessment in mind, Subpart B
considers the costs of excluding litigation option holders in terms of deterrence,
compensation, and fairness. This analysis connects with scholars’ conceptions of the
class action as a tool of regulatory policy as much as, if not more than, merely a mass
joinder device.15 The conclusion of Part II is that litigation options in transnational
class actions should not bar class certification.

14. Professor Wasserman, describing class actions in different domestic jurisdictions,
adopted the term “dueling class actions.” See generally Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class
Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2000).
15. See generally, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONITA
DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS & ERIK K. MOLLER, CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975); Owen M. Fiss, The Allure
of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965 (1993); Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven
Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733 (1994);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on Compensation and
Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243; George L. Priest,
Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521
(1997); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individualized Justice by
Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987); David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and
Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871
(2002); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It
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Against a background of certified transnational class actions, Part III considers
alternative strategies to respond to the threat of asymmetric relitigation. Taking a cue
from scholars who understand class actions as litigation transactions,16 this Part
proposes a transactional approach to preclusion uncertainty—tapping into private
information and private incentives to induce preclusion through bargaining. In
addition, this Part suggests innovative approaches to achieve interjurisdictional
preclusion in dueling class actions and other circumstances.
Part IV turns briefly to a different vantage. Once a foreign court enters a judgment
in a class action or other aggregate proceeding, how should U.S. courts treat that
judgment? This Part demonstrates that the insights of this Article support and
elaborate existing U.S. rules for foreign judgment recognition and domestic class
action preclusion. In short, this approach values legislative preferences about
aggregation and preclusion, but is sensitive to due process interests as well.
In sum, this Article approaches litigation options in transnational class actions
from a position that links procedural forms to substantive law values. The class action
is not an end in itself but a tool to effectuate deterrence and compensation, to mitigate
conflicts among putative class members, and to manage complex disputes. In
responding to the transnational litigation environment, this Article attempts to tap
into the strengths of legislatures, courts, and private parties to create default
welfare-enhancing rules while also harnessing private information and incentives in
service of these policy goals. For both aggregation and preclusion, good policy must
account for substantive choices, informational asymmetries, and differing
institutional capabilities and incentives.
The analysis undertaken in this Article primarily employs the perspective of a
U.S. court hearing a transnational class action. The United States is a natural example
because, although not alone among jurisdictions with class action procedures, it is
by far the most significant in terms of magnitude of cases and commentary. Further,
readers likely are most familiar with the background rules of U.S. law and the
substantive values that motivate U.S. procedural choices, which are important in
responding to litigation options. But the lessons of this Article would be relevant to
any court hearing a transnational case—and, indeed, the Appendix collects many

Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation:
A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2006) (“Lawsuits and investment
projects have much in common.”); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the
Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164 (2003) [hereinafter Nagareda,
Preexistence Principle] (“Rule 23 is as much a regulatory regime as it is a procedural rule for
the conduct of litigation in aggregate. The regulated market here is the market for legal
representation of would-be class members.”). See generally Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D.
Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053 (2013);
Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009); William B.
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001). Indeed, at least
one author applied an options analogy to class settlements. See Richard A. Nagareda,
Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747
(2002) [hereinafter Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options]. Another considered
options with respect to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. See Jack Ratliff, Offensive
Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1988).
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examples of foreign aggregate litigation mechanisms.17 This collection of foreign
approaches is also significant for what it says about the importance of these
questions. If litigation options are created when multiple forums allow for
cost-effective litigation of the same claim, then the rise of foreign aggregate litigation
means that transnational litigation options will only become more prevalent.18 In
other words, courts should expect to see more and more cases like those addressed
in this Article, thereby amplifying the consequences of policy responses to
transnational litigation options.
I. LITIGATION OPTIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL CLASS ACTIONS
The class action is a procedural tool that advances substantive law values such as
deterrence, compensation, fairness, and efficiency.19 Opt-out class actions in
particular achieve these goals by aggregating claims not only of active participants
but also of passive plaintiffs.20 In so doing, the opt-out class action can increase

17. See Clopton, supra note 6. The insights here also may be extended to litigation optionality
in purely domestic cases. See infra Parts II.B, III (discussing domestic litigation options).
18. The relative immaturity of foreign aggregate litigation is one of the reasons that U.S.
courts have not seen more defendants objecting to transnational class actions on this basis. For
other reasons, see infra note 62.
19. See supra note 15 (collecting sources).
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (defining opt-out class actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)
(providing their scope). See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen
Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849
(1998). This feature of the class action is in tension with the day-in-court ideal. See Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (referring to “our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
have his own day in court’” (citation omitted)); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It
is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by
a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he
has not been made a party by service of process.”). For a selection of the many excellent
discussions of this tension, see generally, for example, MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE
JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT
(2009); Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992); Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 651 (2014); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); Fiss, supra
note 15; Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 337 [hereinafter Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy]; Samuel Issacharoff,
When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents
in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189 (1992); Douglas Laycock, Due
Process of Law in Trilateral Disputes, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (1993); David L. Shapiro, Class
Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998); Susan P. Sturm,
The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1993); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the
Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571 (1997). The United States is not
alone in foregoing the individual day in court in some cases. In Wendenburg v. Germany, for
example, the European Court of Human Rights explained that “in proceedings involving a
decision for a collective number of individuals, it is not always required or even possible that
every individual is heard before a court.” 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (2003).
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deterrence and compensation while reducing potential collective-action problems
among putative class members.21
When some class members are not bound by the outcome and can litigate their
case again, “litigation options” result. The term “litigation options” has both a
conventional and technical meaning. Conventionally, passive plaintiffs can choose
between accepting the first outcome and waiting for a future case. Technically, in
finance an option is the right of the option holder to buy or sell an asset at a set price.
The option holder can choose, based on all available information, when to exercise
the option. If the option holder has the right to buy an asset for fifty dollars, for
example, then her option would be “in the money” when the market price of the asset
is more than fifty dollars.22 In the class action, passive plaintiffs who are not bound
by the first adjudication hold litigation options.23 The litigation option is the right to
become a party to litigation and capture any settlement or judgment that results. An
option holder in a class action could exercise her option to join the class and be bound
by its outcome. Or, she could wait until the first case was resolved, and if she were
unsatisfied with the outcome, she could retain the option and join a new suit (e.g., in
a foreign court). Indeed, if the second suit were an opt-out class action as well,24 the
option holder could wait until both class actions were resolved before deciding how
to exercise the option.25 Like owners of financial options, the litigation option holder
exercises her option when it is in the money.26
Granting litigation options (at no charge) creates a facial imbalance between
plaintiffs and defendants that “immediately strikes us as unfair.”27 If the defendant
loses, passive plaintiffs will exercise their options and reap the rewards. But if the
defendant wins, passive plaintiffs can bring another suit and try again in a second
suit. Heads I win; tails you lose.
Litigation options also have potentially injurious social-welfare consequences.
Public- and private-law litigation serves important social goals such as compensation

21. See infra Part II.B.1.
22. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 183–98 (7th ed. 2012). If the option
holder has the right to buy an asset, she holds a “call option”; if she has the right to sell, it is a
“put option.” Id. at 183.
23. One might characterize the litigation option as a call. See supra note 22. The call
option holder has the right to buy a share in the litigation. In theory, the strike price for
litigation call options is zero. In practice, it may be that the strike price is right to relitigate.
Exercising a litigation option by claiming on a settlement fund likely requires a release, see
infra note 168, and it is more difficult to relitigate after claiming on a successful judgment,
see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
24. See Clopton, supra note 6 (collecting examples of foreign jurisdictions with opt-out
style mass litigation).
25. Option holders likely could claim the benefit of a case during litigation, during the
claim period following settlement or judgment, or as long as they have causes of action to
which nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel applies. See infra note 137 and accompanying
text (discussing nonmutual estoppel).
26. The claim here is not that everything that is true about financial options would be true
about litigation options. The goal of the comparison is to signify which passive plaintiffs may be
able to relitigate abroad, see infra Part II.A; to suggest that options may be priced, see infra note
211; and to highlight the dynamic among plaintiffs and defendants across multiple forums.
27. Ratliff, supra note 16, at 77.
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and deterrence.28 If litigation produces systematically inaccurate results, it distorts
the underlying substantive law.29 Litigation options threaten to do just that because
they asymmetrically increase plaintiffs’ expected recovery and settlement leverage
against defendants.30 Defendants worried about the asymmetric risk of relitigation
would be more interested in buying global peace than would be socially optimal
(assuming that the one-shot litigation is calibrated to the socially optimal level).31
Unless the class action is binding on all class members, therefore, there exists an
asymmetry that may have costs to defendants and to social welfare.
In the United States, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (since 1966) and
subsequent cases respond to litigation options.32 Although courts have been willing
to draw exceptions, U.S. courts treat opt-out class judgments as binding on all class
members who do not opt out, provided due process was protected.33 This means
that parties in class actions should have symmetric stakes. And because of

28. For further discussion of these values, see infra Part II.B.
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011)
(expressing concern with “‘in terrorem’ settlements”); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d
672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009) (“When the potential liability created by a lawsuit is very great, even
though the probability that the plaintiff will succeed in establishing liability is slight, the
defendant will be under pressure to settle rather than to bet the company, even if the betting
odds are good . . . .”); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120
(1973) (discussing class-action “blackmail settlements”); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg,
“Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2000).
31. This is not the forum to explain in great detail the effects of litigation asymmetries.
For modeling of these effects, see generally, for example, Bruce L. Hay, Some Settlement
Effects of Preclusion, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 21; Stephen J. Spurr, An Economic Analysis of
Collateral Estoppel, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 47 (1991); Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap:
An Economic Analysis of the Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940 (1992).
Nor is this the forum to adjudicate the value of redundant litigation. See generally Zachary D.
Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 68 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
32. I add the caveat “and subsequent cases” because the drafters of the federal rules
recognized a tension between their procedural jurisdiction and preclusion law’s substantive
effect. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 393 (1967) (noting that Rule
23 did not attempt to prescribe the rules of preclusion); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
17, 53–58 (2010) (discussing Rule 23 and the Enabling Act). Here, as elsewhere, the Supreme
Court was willing to affect substantive rights in ways that the Advisory Committee, conscious
of Rules Enabling Act’s constraints, was not. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang,
Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1603–14 (2014).
33. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985). But see Hazard et al.,
supra note 20 (cataloging a history of exceptions and equivocation). Admittedly, relying on
Shutts for this proposition may reflect what Professor Wolff called the “Shutts fallacy”—
reading Shutts to cover procedural due process generally rather than limiting it to personal
jurisdiction. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2076–80, 2116 (2008). Yet this is a fallacy
that courts (including the Supreme Court) have indulged, id., and no doubt some due process
is required for any judgment to be binding (with or without Shutts).
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full-faith-and-credit obligations,34 class judgments may bind class members in
other U.S. courts whether they were active or passive participants in the first suit.
Binding all class members not only equalizes stakes between plaintiffs and
defendants but also responds to potential conflicts of interest within the class. Mass
claims present classic collective-action problems in which each potential plaintiff
would prefer to free ride on other plaintiffs’ litigation efforts.35 At the same time,
agency problems within the class (and with respect to class counsel) create costs of
their own.36 In U.S. courts, class judgments may be preclusive against all class
members, thus responding to the collective-action problem, while requiring notice,37
opt out,38 and judicial supervision39 to deal with agency costs. Indeed, U.S. courts
have found such due process protections necessary to make opt-out class actions
binding on passive plaintiffs.40
The foregoing description shows how U.S. courts achieve symmetric preclusion
in opt-out class actions. But there is at least one notable exception to this stylized
story: transnational class actions.41 While U.S. courts grant full faith and credit to
sister court judgments, there is no international legal obligation for foreign courts to
do the same. As it turns out, many foreign legal systems are reluctant to give
preclusive effect to class judgments as applied to passive plaintiffs.42 It may be that
foreign jurisdictions do not accept notice, opt out, and court supervision as sufficient
protections for passive plaintiffs, or simply that they reject class actions as a method
of dispute resolution.43 In any event, if it is true that foreign courts may not enforce
class judgments against passive plaintiffs, then those plaintiffs possess litigation
options. Any passive class member with access to a foreign forum gets the benefit of

34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). See generally Stephen B. Burbank,
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General
Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986); Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign
Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53 (1984).
35. For example, it would be cheaper for plaintiffs to sit out the first suit and then use
nonmutual offensive issue preclusion to sue defendant or extract a settlement. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–33 (1979).
36. See Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 702–09
(2013) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions]; Issacharoff, Governance and
Legitimacy, supra note 20, at 353–66.
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (notice).
38. See id.
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (adequacy); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requirements for
Rule 23(b)(3) actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (conducting the action); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)
(settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (class counsel).
40. See supra note 33.
41. For the definition of “transnational class actions,” see supra text accompanying
note 1. And for domestic examples of litigation options, see infra Parts II.B
42. See Clopton, supra note 6.
43. A more cynical interpretation is that these states promote their citizens’ interests by
permitting them to sue noncitizen defendants serially. I find this interpretation dubious,
especially given the nature of the foreign doctrines at issue. See generally Rhonda Wasserman,
Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313
(2011) (collecting and reviewing relevant European-law examples).
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a U.S. adjudication and the benefit of a second bite at the apple, including the ability
to threaten that second bite during settlement negotiations in the first case.44
This problem is more than theoretical. American courts have faced numerous
class actions with these alignments: securities cases, even after Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, Ltd., may involve U.S. and foreign investors in a purported class;45
Alien Tort Statute litigation necessarily involves alien plaintiffs and often takes the
form of a class action;46 and transnational classes could exist in consumer,
environmental, antitrust, employment, tort, or civil-rights cases. And, as noted above,
foreign courts open to these cases will not always treat prior U.S. adjudications as
binding on passive plaintiffs.47
To their credit, some U.S. judges have recognized litigation options in
transnational class actions, although for reasons explained below, their analysis has
been incomplete.48 As noted above, Judge Henry Friendly was an early critic of these
dynamics in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.49 Howard Bersch, a U.S. citizen, sued
for securities fraud on behalf of himself and thousands of similarly situated
individuals.50 Judge Friendly described the putative plaintiffs as “preponderantly
citizens and residents of Canada, Australia, England, France, Germany, Switzerland,
and many other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America.”51 Among the
issues on appeal was whether class certification was appropriate when foreign courts
may not grant preclusive effect to the U.S. class judgment.52 Judge Friendly asserted
that “if defendants prevail against a class they are entitled to a victory no less broad
than a defeat would have been.”53 Because Judge Friendly found that nonrecognition
of the U.S. judgment in many of the relevant jurisdictions was a “near certainty,” he
excluded all foreign class members from the case.54 To Judge Friendly in Bersch,
litigation options were unacceptable.
Since Bersch, some lower courts have worried about the preclusion available to
U.S. class judgments.55 These courts typically channeled Bersch’s concern into Rule

44. Of course, the same litigation option may exist in other legal systems with opt-out
rules. See Clopton, supra note 6.
45. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); see infra note 58 (explaining Morrison’s role in this context).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011).
47. See Clopton, supra note 6.
48. For further explanation, see infra Part II.
49. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated as stated in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp.,
729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
50. Id. at 981.
51. Id. at 977–78.
52. Id. at 996–97.
53. Id. at 996.
54. Id. at 996–97.
55. E.g., Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 129 n.8 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting “significant
doubts” about Austrian plaintiffs); Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105, 114–
21 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (following Vivendi), vacated and remanded on other grounds by St.
Stephen’s Sch. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., 570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014);
In re Infineon Techs. AG Sec. Litig., 266 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (acknowledging these
concerns); Buettgen v. Harless, 263 F.R.D. 378, 382 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (acknowledging
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23’s “superiority” requirement, which provides that a class may be maintained if “the
court finds that . . . a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and

Bersch’s concerns); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(following Vivendi); Mohanty v. Bigband Networks, Inc., No. C 07–5101 SBA, 2008 WL
426250, at *7–*8 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (acknowledging Bersch’s concerns); Marsden v. Select
Med. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 480, 486 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (following Vivendi); Borochoff v.
Glaxosmithkline PLC, 246 F.R.D. 201, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (acknowledging Bersch’s
concerns); In re Vivendi Universal SA Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 58–62); In re Royal Ahold NV Sec. and ERISA Litig., 219
F.R.D. 343, 352 (D. Md. 2003) (expressing concern about enforceability); In re
DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 301 (D. Del. 2003) (excluding foreign class
members); In re Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetler AS Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 353, 360–61 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (acknowledging Bersch’s concerns); Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113, 134–
35 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing Bersch); Ansari v. N.Y. Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 116–17
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying certification of foreign class); Del Fierro v. Pepsico Int’l, 897 F.
Supp. 59, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (acknowledging Bersch’s concerns); Frietsch v. Refco, Inc.,
No. 92 C 6844, 1994 WL 10014, at *11 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (acknowledging Bersch’s concerns);
CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 127 F.R.D. 454, 459–60 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(refusing to certify British claimants); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 48–51 (S.D.
Cal. 1975) (acknowledging Bersch’s concerns); see also Clopton, supra note 6 (cataloging
decisions). In addition, these issues have been discussed in briefing in, inter alia, Lead
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Class Certification and
Appointment of Class Representatives and Class Counsel, In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 865 F.
Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-CV-4095), 2012 WL 1574445; Declaration of
Professor Jonathan Harris in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to BP’s Motion to Dismiss the
Ordinary Share Claims in the Consolidated Class Action Complaint of Dr. Jonathan M. Harris,
B.C.L., M.A., Ph.D., In re BP PLC Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (No. 10MD-2185), 2011 WL 6961188; Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Consolidated Class Action Complaint; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
Thereof, In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig., 2012 WL 3791716 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012)
(No. CV-10-0922 DSF), 2011 WL 270118; Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support Of
Their Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss Foreign Lead Plaintiffs’ Claims, In re UBS AG Sec.
Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 97, 037 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 07-CV-11225), 2008 WL 4959645;
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In re
Converium Holding AG Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 1041480 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2007) (No.
04-CV-7897), 2007 WL 3194368; Bridgestone Corporation's Combined Memorandum in
Support of Its Motion to Dismiss, in Part, for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and in
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In re Bridgestone Sec. Litig., 430 F.
Supp. 2d 728 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (No. 3:01-0017), 2006 WL 6005492; Memorandum of Law
of Deloitte & Touche LLP, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and James E. Copeland In Opposition
to Lead Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification, In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 258
F.R.D. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 04-CV-0030), 2006 WL 6011431; Declaration of Alexis
Mourre, Brockamp v. N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij, 2005 WL
6337193 (D.N.J. May 11, 2005) (No. 3:04CV00374); and in the context of forum non
conveniens in, inter alia, In re Banco Santander Secs.-Optimal Litig., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1305
(S.D. Fla. 2010); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 5958061
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008) (No. MD 06-1775). On rare occasion, a court may consider the
practicalities of foreign relitigation as part of this inquiry. See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig.,
69 F.R.D. 24, 48–49 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
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efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”56 The Madoff litigation described in the
Introduction provides one example.57 Another illustrative treatment is In re Vivendi
Universal.58 In addressing superiority, the Vivendi court acknowledged the logic
of Bersch and its progeny, though it asked whether foreign nonrecognition was
“more likely than not” rather than applying Bersch’s “near certainty” test.59 After
surveying the recognition law of France, England, Germany, Austria, and the
Netherlands,60 the court concluded that French, English, and Dutch plaintiffs
would remain in the class because the courts of those nations more likely than not
would give preclusive effect to the U.S. judgment.61 German and Austrian
plaintiffs were excluded because their courts, more likely than not, would not treat
a U.S. class judgment as preclusive.62

56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 3–10. Recall that the Anwar court excluded
plaintiffs from Germany, Israel, Kuwait, Korea, North Korea, Pitcairn, Tokelau, Mongolia,
China, Liechtenstein, Japan, Oman, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Bosnia, Andorra, San Marino, Namibia, Monaco, and South Africa. See supra notes 8–10 and
accompanying text.
58. 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Morrison ultimately mooted this issue in Vivendi
because most of the foreign plaintiffs purchased shares on foreign exchanges. See Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010) (holding that the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provided a cause of action only for shares sold on domestic exchanges). However,
foreign citizens may purchase shares on U.S. exchanges, and indeed that scenario led to the
transnational class action in Marsden v. Select Med. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
In Marsden, foreign plaintiff Capital Invest purchased defendant Select Medical’s stock on the
New York Stock Exchange. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of
Their Motion for Class Certification at 19, Marsden v. Select Med. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 480
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 2:04-CV-4020), 2007 WL 4765821. Such a case would skirt Morrison
but not Bersch and Vivendi.
59. See In re Vivendi Universal, 242 F.R.D. at 95.
60. See id. at 95–105.
61. Id. at 105.
62. Id. at 105–06. In addition to those reported cases cited above, other transnational class
actions could have created litigation options if permitted to run their course. Some of these
may have been resolved in favor of defendants before certification. See Linda S. Mullenix,
Dropping the Spear: The Case for Enhanced Summary Judgment Prior to Class Certification,
43 AKRON L. REV. 1197, 1207–12 (2010) (surveying decisions on precertification dispositive
motions). In others, defendants may have preferred settlement to fighting this issue. See infra
text accompanying note 132; see also infra note 179 and accompanying text. Or, it may be
that all parties acknowledged that relitigation abroad posed nearly zero risk, see infra Part II.A,
or that statutes of limitations or laches defenses were available in the putative foreign suit, see
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 202 n.3 (1947) (noting the similarity among res judicata,
laches, and statutes of limitations). But the rise of foreign aggregate litigation, including
venues for foreign human-rights litigation after Kiobel and foreign securities litigation after
Morrison, may make these issues more pressing. See, e.g., Caroline Kaeb & David Scheffer,
The Paradox of Kiobel in Europe, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 852 (2013) (discussing European
human-rights litigation after Kiobel); Michael Palmisciano, Note, Going Dutch: The Effects of
Domestic Restriction and Foreign Acceptance of Class Litigation on American Securities
Fraud Plaintiffs, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1847 (2012) (suggesting European alternatives for securities
plaintiffs); see also Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on Common Principles for
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The few scholarly commentaries to address these issues tend to track this logic.
At least two articles directly advocated the Bersch-Vivendi model—that is, to exclude
some or all foreign plaintiffs from U.S. classes if they seem to possess asymmetric
opportunities for relitigation.63 Professor Rhonda Wasserman also seemed to suggest
that an exclusionary approach is appropriate for these foreign plaintiffs.64 Professor
Tanya Monestier agreed that asymmetric relitigation is problematic, though her
response allowed foreign plaintiffs to participate if they affirmatively opted in.65
Thus, rather than completely excluding foreign plaintiffs, Monestier relegated them to
a separate, opt-in group. Finally, Professors Simard and Tidmarsh offered a more
nuanced approach.66 They proposed a series of presumptions designed to identify
which plaintiffs in which cases are most likely to relitigate67—a topic this Article picks
up below.68 Simard and Tidmarsh then excluded those foreign plaintiffs likely to
relitigate while allowing those that are not likely to relitigate to remain in the class.69

Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States
Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union Law 2013/396/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 201)
60 (calling for Europe-wide implementation of injunctive and compensatory aggregate
dispute resolution by July 26, 2015).
63. See generally Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Requirement and
Transnational Class Actions: Excluding Foreign Class Members in Favor of European
Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2011); Gary W. Johnson, Note, Rule 23 and
the Exclusion of Foreign Citizens as Class Members in U.S. Class Actions, 52 VA. J. INT’L L.
963 (2012). Unlike these treatments, Ilana T. Buschkin argued for inclusion of foreign
claimants on deterrence grounds alone. See generally Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability
of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy—Permitting Foreign Claimants To Be
Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563
(2005). Professor Walker reached a similar conclusion from the perspective of Canadian law.
See generally Janet Walker, Crossborder Class Actions: A View from Across the Border, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 755.
64. Wasserman, supra note 43, at 316. Professor Wasserman’s article also helpfully
explained why U.S. judgments fare worse in Europe than expected. See id. at 335–78.
65. Tanya J. Monestier, Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res
Judicata, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5–6, 8–14 (2011). Monestier also suggested that U.S. courts lack
the capacity to assure themselves of the preclusive effect of their judgments. Id. at 20–60.
66. Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational Class
Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2011). The work of Simard and Tidmarsh was exceptionally
helpful in thinking through the issues in this Article. This Article deviates from their approach
on a few levels. See infra notes 98, 107, 125, 138, 164. Differences between this Article’s
approach and Simard and Tidmarsh’s include the following: (i) parties have better information
than courts about relitigation risk; (ii) opt-in mechanisms improve upon exclusionary
approaches, but do not eliminate underdeterrence (and undercompensation); (iii) including all
potential class members (including option holders) maximizes substantive law values; and
(iv) private information and incentives can help to reduce overdeterrence. The proposals in
Parts III and IV also materially differ from that of Simard and Tidmarsh, which fails to discuss
private mechanisms or foreign judgments.
67. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 124–25.
68. See infra Parts II.A and III.A.
69. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 124–28.
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And, like Monestier, Simard and Tidmarsh propose that excluded foreign plaintiffs
may rejoin the class through an opt-in mechanism.70
What unifies these scholarly approaches, and the judicial opinions cited above, is
that they ask courts to identify relevant foreign plaintiffs and exclude them from
opt-out class actions. These courts and scholars are right to recognize that litigation
options create asymmetries. But, as described below, these approaches fail to identify
relevant option holders and understate the consequences of excluding some or all
foreign plaintiffs. A better approach is sensitive to the transnational litigation
environment and to the substantive law values that motivate these cases.
II. AGGREGATING OPTION HOLDERS
As explained in the previous Part, litigation options in transnational class actions
produce asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants, which may create social
costs from skewed results and may be unfair to defendants and other plaintiffs. The
law of preclusion is designed to solve these problems. Among U.S. jurisdictions, full
faith and credit provides that sister-state judgments are given the preclusive effect
assigned by the rendering jurisdiction,71 and the Supreme Court has (more or less)
suggested that class resolutions are binding on absentees to the same extent as
traditional judgments.72
The first-best approach, therefore, aligns preclusion rules across international
jurisdictions using a full-faith-and-credit model.73 If foreign jurisdictions gave class
judgments the same preclusive effect as would the rendering court, then the
interjurisdictional nature of a suit would not create new option holders. An
international treaty on judgment preclusion would be an obvious and simple response
to litigation options, and indeed international law is an oft-mentioned solution to the
challenges of transnational litigation.74 But international efforts to deal with

70. Id. In addition to the sources just described, a number of excellent treatments of
transnational securities class actions prior to Morrison addressed some of the challenges of
concurrent jurisdiction that Morrison addressed. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, U.S. Class
Actions and the “Global Class,” 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2009); Hannah L. Buxbaum,
Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict,
46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14 (2007); Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational
Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465; see also supra
note 58 (discussing Morrison). Indeed, Professor Buxbaum concluded that foreign citizens
should remain in U.S. class actions, though this recommendation was made against the
backdrop of her proposal to limit the scope of the underlying causes of action. Buxbaum,
supra, at 69.
71. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012). See generally Burbank, supra
note 34. Professor Casad recommended a similar approach for U.S. courts considering foreign
judgments. Casad, supra note 34, at 70–76.
72. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985).
73. See supra note 71. Another first-best approach would eliminate concurrent
jurisdiction. But this too seems unlikely. Modern choice of law, not to mention modern
regulation and modern life, make it so that overlapping prescriptive jurisdiction is a feature of
the system. But see Buxbaum, supra note 70 (arguing for this approach with respect to one
slice of the law).
74. There has been some progress in this field, including an international arbitration
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jurisdiction and judgments have stalled,75 and it is hard to believe that class-action
judgments would produce international consensus any time soon.76
In the absence of an international law of preclusion, second-best alternatives
prioritize preclusion symmetry or aggregation.77 The courts mentioned above have
chosen preclusion over aggregation. While opt-in proposals sound like they avoid
the aggregation-preclusion tradeoff, they too choose preclusion over aggregation.78
Framers of Rule 23 understood that for low-value claims, opting in was not
realistic.79 More recent scholarly treatments have described opt-out regimes as
responding to opt-in’s shortcomings with respect to collective-action problems within
the putative class, costs to social values such as deterrence, and finality problems.80 At

treaty, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958), and various Hague Conventions on private
international law. See generally, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments: Where We Are and the Road Ahead, 4
EUR. J.L. REFORM 219 (2002); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed
Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203 (2001); Arthur T.
von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the
Hague Conference?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1994, at 271.
75. See generally A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE
HAGUE (John J. Barceló III & Kevin M. Clermont, eds., 2002) (describing many basic
difficulties that must be resolved in creating a global law of jurisdiction and judgments). But
see Ronald A. Brand, Jurisdictional Developments and the New Hague Judgments Project, in
A COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW—ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS VAN LOON
(2013) (suggesting renewed optimism).
76. See Clopton, supra note 6. A unilateral declaration of reciprocity would be another
approach. For reasons to doubt its efficacy, see infra note 190.
77. See supra notes 49–62 and accompanying text.
78. Professor Monestier proposed opt-in for foreign class members, Monestier, supra
note 65, at 60–78, and Professors Simard and Tidmarsh treated opt-in as a sufficient condition
for foreign participation in any U.S. class action, Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 126–
27. For a failed attempt at opt-in under these circumstances, see Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393
F.3d 120, 124–29 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing district court’s opt-in-like class definition).
79. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1787, at 521–22 (3d ed. 2005) (“The ability of a member to secure
the benefits of a successful termination of the action without affirmatively pressing an individual
claim is particularly important because it assures that small claimants who would be unable to
protect their rights through separate suits can take advantage of the judgment in the class action
without the burden of actually participating. It was for this reason that the 1966 Advisory
Committee specifically rejected the notion of requiring absent class members to opt into the
action to secure its benefits.” (footnote omitted)); see also Kaplan, supra note 32, at 397–98.
80. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come
to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009) (reviewing these arguments); see also Issacharoff,
Governance and Legitimacy, supra note 20, at 367–68; David Rosenberg, Adding a Second
Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19. But
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 288 (2010) (questioning critics of opt-in mechanisms). For behavioral-economics
insights that may, in some circumstances, justify opt-out default rules, see generally Cass R.
Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826,
1879–89 (2013). For the underwhelming effects of opt-in under the Fair Labor Standards Act,

1402

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:1387

a minimum, opt-in reduces the number of plaintiffs, which necessarily reduces the
number of individuals receiving compensation and (perhaps more importantly in many
low-value cases) reduces the deterrence of wrongful behavior directly through the
threat of damage awards or indirectly through the insurance market.81
Exclusion or opt-in remedies have dominated the discourse on transnational class
actions, but these approaches are misguided and not entirely justified. First, Subpart
A will explain that these approaches misapprehend the risk of foreign relitigation.
Citizenship misses the mark, and courts may lack the information necessary to
identify relevant option holders. This informational problem is important because, as
Subpart A further explains, the likelihood of relitigation is uneven and probably
lower than many assume. Subpart B then turns to those countervailing considerations
that justify including option holders in U.S. class actions. Not only do exclusionary
approaches fail, but they also create costs to deterrence and fairness that can be
avoided by including all plaintiffs with valid claims. For these reasons, courts should
reject exclusionary remedies and allow foreign option holders to remain in
transnational class actions.
Before exploring these topics more fully, it is important to identify a few issues
that are not relevant but occasionally seep into the debate. First, this Part is not about
the merits of class actions generally.82 Nor does it explore the optimal class size83 or
the optimal number of adjudications.84 These are worthy inquiries, but their answers
have no special bearing on the cases in this Article. In addition, this Part assumes
that the putative class would meet other class-action requirements.85 For example,
opt-out class actions require notice to potential plaintiffs,86 and in theory it could be
more difficult to effect proper notice to overseas plaintiffs. This Article assumes that
such problems can be overcome.87 In a similar vein, the putative foreign class
members discussed here are assumed to have properly stated claims.88 There is no
question that the United States has prescriptive jurisdiction as a matter of statutory

see generally Charlotte S. Alexander, Would an Opt In Requirement Fix the Class Action
Settlement? Evidence from the Fair Labor Standards Act, 80 MISS. L.J. 443 (2010). And for a
European perspective, see generally Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action
for European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409 (2009).
81. This Article later returns to opt-in, see infra Part III.A, and discusses positive-value
claims, see infra note 138.
82. I would not even begin to note the mammoth literature for and against class actions. I
leave it to the reader (and Westlaw) to find these sources. For a starting point, see supra note 15.
83. Proposals to optimize class size do not tell us whether the inclusion or exclusion of
foreign class members is preferable in all cases. See, e.g., David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh,
Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Indivisible” Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542,
566–68 (2011).
84. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995);
Clopton, supra note 31.
85. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
87. See infra Part III.C (discussing notice under foreign law).
88. Note also that although the excluded class members are foreign citizens, one need not
resolve the apparent tension between national and global welfare because these foreign
plaintiffs have domestic causes of action and thus the relevant conduct is within the scope of
intended deterrence.
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interpretation,89 constitutional law,90 international law,91 and comity.92 Finally, I refer
throughout to the source of the substantive law, rights, and remedial scheme, by which
I mean the substantive law under which plaintiffs bring their causes of action.93 For
reasons discussed below, there are substantive and structural reasons to link procedural
mechanisms with the source of substantive rights.94 For this Part, therefore, I assume
that the source of the substantive law provides for class actions—for example, a U.S.
federal-law claim to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.
A. Assessing Relitigation Risk
As one article put it, “The principal concern driving the exclusion of foreign
citizens is the fear of relitigation.”95 But the judicial approaches described above are
not well suited to identify when that fear is justified, and indeed there are reasons to
doubt that courts would be capable of doing so.
To begin with, the exclusion remedy is fundamentally flawed in its focus on
citizenship. Current judicial and scholarly approaches seek to identify foreign
jurisdictions that will not recognize U.S. judgments and then exclude their citizens
from class treatment. But many court systems are open to domestic and foreign
plaintiffs. Concluding that a German court will not recognize a U.S. class judgment
means that all plaintiffs with causes of action in Germany—not just German
citizens—could be option holders.96 Indeed, U.S. citizen class members may join

89. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010) (holding
that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided a cause of action only for shares sold on
domestic exchanges).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1103
n.432 (2011) (collecting due-process challenges in transnational cases). See generally Lea
Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992); A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal
Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379 (1997).
91. U.S. courts construe ambiguous statutes in keeping with international law. See Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See generally Curtis A.
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive
Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1997).
92. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004)
(articulating a rule, derived from principles of prescriptive comity, to “construe[] ambiguous
statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations”);
United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 158 (1933) (relying on comity to limit maritime law);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 612–13 (9th Cir. 1976) (relying on
comity to limit antitrust law).
93. For example, U.S. courts hear claims arising under domestic and foreign laws, so
merely identifying the forum does not predict the source of substantive rights.
94. See infra Part II.B.
95. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 125.
96. It also does not mean that every German-citizen plaintiff would have a cause of action
in German courts, let alone a cost-effective one.
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foreign proceedings as active or passive participants,97 so a policy to eliminate
litigation optionality must tolerate excluding some Americans as well.98
This insight has two important implications. First, courts relying on citizenship
are not properly targeting option holders. (This Subpart returns to the challenge of
identifying option holders shortly.) Second, were courts to take seriously an approach
that excluded option holders, then the existence of any nonrecognizing foreign forum
with a plausible connection to the litigation could turn all plaintiffs into option
holders and thus subject them to exclusion.99 Although some judges and scholars
might cheer for the demise of the opt-out class action, it would be odd to permit a
foreign court’s preclusion choices to strike the death knell.
One potential response to this critique is that citizenship is proxy for litigation
convenience—it would be easier for French litigants to sue in Paris than in Berlin or
New York. But gone are the days when a party physically files her case at the
courthouse, and, in any event, one would expect an enterprising plaintiffs’ attorney
to match up a suitable plaintiff with an amenable forum.100
Replacing citizenship with a cause-of-action test would be an improvement but it
would not account for the likelihood of relitigation. The mere availability of foreign
causes of action is insufficient to lead to relitigation unless such suits are cost
effective for plaintiffs—and, perhaps more importantly, plaintiffs’ counsel.101 For

97. For example, many Americans were included in the Canadian class in the IMAX securities
litigation. See infra notes 200–06 and accompanying text. And, at least two Dutch settlements have
purported to bind absentee U.S. plaintiffs. See Hof’s-Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 2009, 325 m.nt.
Scholten en Van Achterberg, (In de zaak van Randstand Holding, N.V.) (Neth.); Hof’s-Amsterdam
29 april 2009, JOR 2009, 196 m.nt. AFJA Leijten (Vie d’Or) (Neth.); see also HÉLÈNE VAN LITH,
THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS ACT AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ASPECTEN VAN
INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT IN DE WCAM 70–74 (2010).
98. Simard and Tidmarsh also acknowledged that foreign courts are open to noncitizen
plaintiffs, but they excluded American plaintiffs from this insight. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra
note 66, at 91 n.12. Although U.S. courts may have more flexibility to enjoin an American
plaintiff abroad, there are reasons to doubt this limitation in practice, including limits on
personal jurisdiction and antisuit-injunction authority. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan,
Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1148, 1179 (1998). More to the point, the U.S. court has no power to enjoin the foreign
court. If a foreign court were willing to allow relitigation by foreign passive plaintiffs, could
it not reach the same conclusion for American passive plaintiffs regardless of U.S. law?
99. Perhaps foreign courts would not be open to all potential U.S.-court plaintiffs. For
example, the foreign state may not recognize a cause of action for securities fraud on a foreign
exchange. Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010). But it is
doubtful that substantive law limits will resolve all cases, though it may create further
distinctions among potential class members. And, in any event, this does not resolve the
question of cost-effectiveness. See infra notes 101–06 and accompanying text.
100. Indeed, at least one American law firm has developed a cottage industry in
foreign-court securities suits on behalf of purchasers dismissed from U.S. cases based on the
Morrison decision. Grant & Eisenhofer has collaborated on suits in the Netherlands against
Fortis, in Germany against Porsche and Volkswagen, in France against Vivendi Universal, in
Japan against Olympus, and in the United Kingdom against the Royal Bank of Scotland.
Practice Areas: Securities Litigation, GRANT & EISENHOFER, http://www.gelaw.com/practice
-areas/securities-litigation.
101. This assumption applies to anyone with stakes in the litigation: all plaintiffs, the subset
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example, for a small-claim class action, relitigation in a foreign jurisdiction may
be unlikely unless that court had an effective aggregation mechanism sufficient to
overcome collective-action problems. Similarly, the ability to bring a
cost-effective suit abroad may depend on the foreign jurisdiction’s approaches to
attorney compensation,102 filing fees,103 or damages.104 A U.S. court trying to
determine the reasonable likelihood of relitigation thus would need more
information about foreign litigation procedure and practice. Moreover, a switch
from citizenship to causes of action would not relieve the courts of the notoriously
difficult task of assessing foreign preclusion law—that is, whether the foreign court
would treat a U.S. class judgment as preclusive.105 Indeed, courts addressing this
question in transnational class actions have come to opposite conclusions about the
same foreign courts.106 Finally, courts seeking to answer any of these questions
would need to rely on motivated party presentations.107 At best, therefore, courts
have imperfect information about foreign alternatives and they may struggle to
remedy that deficiency.

of plaintiffs footing the bill, class counsel (on contingency or through credit), alternative
litigation financers, or providers of “after the event” litigation insurance. See, e.g., David S.
Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation
Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1078 n.10 (2013); Jasminka Kalajdzic, Peter Cashman,
& Alana Longmoore, Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and
U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 133–34 (2013); Jonathan T. Molot,
Fee Shifting and the Free Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1808–09 (2013).
102. The viability of a foreign cause of action may depend on whether the foreign
jurisdiction permits contingency-fee arrangements or whether it uses the American or English
rule. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 673–76.
103. See, e.g., Otto Sandrock, The Choice Between Forum Selection, Mediation and Arbitration
Clauses: European Perspectives, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 7, 13–14, 24 (2009) (discussing filing
fees and noting that, in some German cases, filing fees can exceed 200,000 euros).
104. The viability of a foreign claim may depend on the availability of punitive or
extra-compensatory damages, see, e.g., Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1420–22 (2009), or on the foreign court’s rules for setoff, see Simard
& Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 103 n.52.
105. For example, Professor Rotem explained the difficulty in determining whether a
foreign court is rejecting judgments selectively or sporadically. Yaad Rotem, The Problem of
Selective or Sporadic Recognition: A New Economic Rationale for the Law of Foreign Country
Judgments, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 505, 516–19 (2010). Professor Wasserman reminded readers
that foreign preclusion decisions derive from the complex interaction among the various rules
of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and choice of law. Wasserman, supra note 43, at 316.
106. See Clopton, supra note 6; see also Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 90 n.9
(collecting examples).
107. See Clopton, supra note 6 (noting some conflicting expert declarations); see also infra
Part III.A (discussing private preclusion’s response to this dynamic). In a sense the same
critique could be leveled at all fact finding in which courts depend on party presentations. At
least three responses are relevant here. First, prior approaches to preclusion asymmetry assume
(or at least seem to assume) that courts can do reasonably well at identifying threats of
relitigation. This assumption seems unwarranted. Second, for the reasons described here, this
particular task is difficult. Third, as explained shortly, because the risk of relitigation is likely
low, we should be particularly wary of courts over-claiming with respect to option holders.
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So far this Subpart has explained that exclusion remedies tied to citizenship are
misguided and that courts are poorly positioned to identify realistic threats of
relitigation. These conclusions do not depend on the empirical question regarding the
size of the problem—that is, how many plaintiffs in how many cases will relitigate a
transnational class action? That said, there are reasons to believe that relitigation risk
is lower than the courts imply.108 To begin with, it would be rational to file first in
the jurisdiction offering the best cost-benefit result.109 American class actions are
attractive, for example, because the combination of class procedures, punitive
damages, juries, and other features of U.S. law make the expected return higher than
foreign alternatives.
Furthermore, the outcome of the first litigation may have an effect on the
cost-benefit calculation in the second forum. The first judgment also could affect the
second adjudication if it receives something less than preclusive value—for example,
persuasive or evidentiary weight.110 A defendant’s victory in the first case also might
change a plaintiff’s assessment of her case’s strength, or it might send this signal to
potential litigation funders or providers of litigation insurance.111 And as long as
some plaintiffs are bound by the first result, the per capita value of the second
litigation likely will be reduced.112
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that second-best alternatives to U.S. class
actions would be other forums with class-action-like mechanisms. But those
jurisdictions with class-like procedures are likely to be more willing to recognize
class judgments, as presumably these jurisdictions have overcome some of the due
process concerns with binding absentees.113
For all of these reasons, therefore, the likelihood of cost-effective relitigation in a
foreign forum may not be high and certainly will not be distributed evenly across
cases and option holders.

108. The low probability of relitigation is significant in two respects: it suggests courts
may be at greater risk to overstate (rather than understate) relevant option holders, and it
further augurs for skepticism of exclusion.
109. Again, the relevant actor here may be a plaintiffs’ attorney. See supra note 101.
110. See, e.g., In re Lloyd’s Am. Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 Civ. 1262 (RWS), 1998 WL
50211, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1998) (noting this phenomenon).
111. See Molot, supra note 101, at 1822 (noting the United Kingdom has “two additional
sets of eyes critically evaluating a claim’s merits”); supra note 101 (discussing class counsel
and other funders). A prior adverse judgment also could increase the likelihood that a foreign
court would deem the second suit frivolous or worthy of sanctions.
112. Total recovery in the second litigation will be lower because the overall claim is
smaller due to a smaller class and potential setoff, see Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at
103 n.52 (discussing setoffs), while litigation costs will be spread across fewer plaintiffs.
113. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, 242 F.R.D. 76, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (speculating
about the Netherlands in this context). Indeed, in a decision postdating the new Dutch
collective-settlement law, a Dutch court recognized a U.S. opt-out settlement and judgment as
preclusive on passive Dutch plaintiffs. See Monestier, supra note 65, at 52 n.178 (discussing
Rechtbank Amsterdam, 23 juni 2010, No. 398833/HA ZA 08-1465 (Stichting Onderzoek
Bedrijfs Informatie Sobi/Deloitte Accountants B.V.) (Neth.)).
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B. Costs of Exclusion
The previous Subpart suggested that current approaches are poorly attuned to
litigation options, and the risk of relitigation they seek to address is unclear, uneven,
and may be quite low. This Subpart furthers that case by exploring the costs of
excluding option holders.
Courts and scholars calling for exclusion treat litigation options as intolerable but
preclusion asymmetries are not unique to transnational class actions, and in other
circumstances, courts tolerate such asymmetries in service of other goals. Most
prominent is the doctrine of nonmutual offensive issue preclusion. In Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore,114 stockholders sued Parklane based on an allegedly false and
misleading proxy statement. Before the class action reached final judgment, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) separately sued Parklane on essentially
the same basis and obtained a declaratory judgment.115 The stockholders sought to
apply the prior judgment as preclusive against Parklane.116 Parklane contended that
this was unfair because a judgment against the SEC (and in favor of Parklane)
would not have been preclusive against the stockholders.117 Permitting preclusion
in this situation, therefore, would be asymmetric.118 The Supreme Court
acknowledged this asymmetry but concluded that judicial economy and litigant
interests outweighed asymmetric preclusion.119 Similarly, in the last few years, the
Supreme Court countenanced litigation asymmetries with respect to class
certification,120 “virtual representation” in Freedom of Information Act cases,121

114. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
115. See id. at 24–25.
116. See id. at 25.
117. See id. at 327 n.7.
118. Professor Currie anticipated this concern. See Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 299–300 (1957).
119. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 322–33. The Parklane Court acknowledged that these values
would not be implicated in every potential case, thus the doctrine has exceptions. Id. at 330–
31. Although the prior judgment in Parklane arose from a suit by the SEC, nonmutual
collateral estoppel also may apply to judgments rendered in litigation between private parties.
See, e.g., Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1994).
120. In Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011), the Court permitted a West Virginia state
class action to proceed even after a Minnesota federal court denied class certification in a
parallel case. The Court reached this conclusion despite asymmetric preclusion:
Bayer warns that under our approach class counsel can repeatedly try to certify
the same class ‘by the simple expedient of changing the named plaintiff in the
caption of the complaint.’ And in this world of ‘serial relitigation of class
certification,’ Bayer contends, defendants ‘would be forced in effect to buy
litigation peace by settling.’
Id. at 2381 (citation omitted).
121. In Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), the Court rejected the government’s
position that claim preclusion should bar relitigation by “virtually represented” parties, even
if that meant subjecting the government to serial asymmetric relitigation in FOIA cases. Id. at
904; see also Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for
Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 611–14 (2011)
(challenging Taylor).
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and parens patriae suits.122
Although tolerating asymmetric preclusion is not universal, these examples
demonstrate that other values matter too. Importantly, the relevant values derive from
the substantive law,123 not the class-action device itself.124 This Subpart considers the
consequences of excluding option holders for deterrence, compensation, and
fairness.125 And, in light of the risk of relitigation and the ability of courts to identify

122. In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014), the Court
held that state-government actions could not be removed to federal court and consolidated
with private class actions, even though this would give the state a litigation option. Id. at 745–
46. As the Chief Justice asked at oral argument: “What prevents attorneys general from around
the country sitting back and waiting . . . as private class actions proceed, and as soon as one
settles or the plaintiffs’ class prevails, taking the same complaint, maybe even hiring the same
lawyers . . . .” Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics
Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736 (2014) (No. 12-1036).
123. Professor Wolff discussed the connection between procedural choices and substantive law
in his exceedingly helpful article on preclusion and aggregation. Tobias Barrington Wolff,
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 789–802 (2005); see also Catherine
M. Sharkey, The Future of Classwide Punitive Damages, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1127, 1128–29
(2013) (discussing the interrelationship between punitive damages and aggregation); Verity
Winship, Aligning Law and Forum: The Home Court Advantage, 81 TENN. L. REV. 1, 15–22 (2013)
(discussing other justifications of bundling substantive and jurisdictional choices).
At the same time, judicially created procedural rules should not distort choices about
substantive law enforcement. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer,
Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 655 (2013) (“[T]he use of class actions
for ‘truly small claims’ is troublesome . . . [if] it results in a level of enforcement that is
substantially different from that contemplated by those responsible for regulatory policy.”);
Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1877–78 (2006) (“The affording or
withholding of aggregate treatment is most problematic from an institutional standpoint when it
operates as a backdoor vehicle to restructure the remedial scheme in applicable substantive
law.”). It is exactly this distortion that troubled critics of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), in which the Supreme Court applied Rule 23 to
maintain a class action under New York substantive law despite a New York statute prohibiting
class certification in such a case filed in state court. Id. at 1444. For a thorough explication of the
problems with this decision, see Burbank & Wolff, supra note 32.
124. Of course, legislatures could specify procedural rules reflecting preferences about the
intensity or scope of private enforcement. See, e.g., Burbank et al., supra note 123. Here, given
the salience of class actions in U.S. law and given the fact that preclusion asymmetry is not a
new phenomenon, it would not be unreasonable to treat aggregation as the U.S. background
rule even in light of litigation options. See Wolff, supra note 123 (suggesting related
circumstances in which courts may infer legislative intent). This assumption would be weaker
in states that require mutuality of estoppel. See id.; Joshua M. D. Segal, Note, Rebalancing
Fairness and Efficiency: The Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in § 1983 Actions, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 1305, app. b (2009) (collecting citations for thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia permitting offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel and seventeen states that do not).
125. Professors Simard and Tidmarsh considered deterrence, compensation, and judicial
efficiency, see Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 128, and Walker and Buschkin also
addressed deterrence as a rationale for including foreign plaintiffs, see Walker, supra note 63,
at 781; Buschkin, supra note 63, at 1594–99. Which values matter will depend on the relevant
substantive law. For ease of explanation, this Subpart will use U.S. law and policy to provide
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it, these countervailing considerations further support including foreign citizens in
U.S. class actions.
1. Deterrence (and Compensation)
The concern with litigation options is that they will result in overdeterrence and
overcompensation, but the exclusion of option holders risks the opposite effect.126 In
addition to compensating victims, litigation should compel internalization of costs
and deter inefficient conduct.127 In repeated individual litigation, defendants can take
advantage of economies of scale not available to plaintiffs; only when plaintiffs can
pool their cases do they approach equal footing with defendants.128 In service of
deterrence, therefore, class actions reduce asymmetries between defendants and
plaintiffs with mass claims.129 The opt-out class action does one better: to eliminate
transaction costs of getting each claimant to sign up, Rule 23 starts from the position
of inclusion within a defined, certified class.130
Remedying litigation asymmetries thus counteracts the endemic underdeterrence
problem of small-value cases.131 But the exclusion of option holders with valid
claims reduces this deterrent effect by reducing the size of the plaintiff class.
Furthermore, if courts are willing to exclude option holders, defendants might use
the threat of exclusion to negotiate suboptimal settlements. Defendants could
threaten to seek exclusion of option holders in pursuit of a lower settlement, and

these background considerations. Cf. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 124–25
(expressing a preference for the court offering the highest expected value irrespective of the
substantive law’s values).
126. This Subpart primarily discusses deterrence, but deterrence and compensation should
move together—though in low-value class actions, the deterrent effect may swallow individual
compensation. See generally Shapiro, supra note 20 (conceptualizing class-action recoveries
as compensation to the class, not to individuals).
127. Class actions, at least negative-expected-value class actions, are justified on this
deterrence rationale. See, e.g., Dam, supra note 15, at 54–56; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, at 30–31 (1991).
128. See, e.g., Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 1384. Interparty symmetry may be
valuable as a matter of equality and as a matter of accuracy. Allowing the plaintiffs to join
forces will equalize stakes and resources, and (in theory) improve accuracy of outcomes. See
id. at 1406–07.
129. See generally Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 30; Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and
Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494 (2013); Judith Resnik, Money Matters:
Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual
and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (2000).
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) provides for opt out, while FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2) allows
for mandatory classes.
131. Professor Rosenberg (among others) has argued this point for decades. See, e.g., Hay
& Rosenberg, supra note 30, at 1389; David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action:
The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 832 (2002); David Rosenberg,
The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System,
97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 902–05 (1984).
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courts would approve such settlements because neither defendants’ nor plaintiffs’
counsel would have the incentive to tell courts about the litigation options.132
The magnitude of underdeterrence (or overdeterrence) is an empirical question
beyond the scope of this project. At a minimum, though, underdeterrence must be
acknowledged as a countervailing consideration in dealing with litigation options,
and it is notable that the courts adopting the exclusion remedy fail to grapple with
it.133 Moreover, there are reasons to think underdeterrence may be more of a problem
in these cases. As explained earlier, the risk of relitigation—and thus the risk of
overdeterrence—has been exaggerated.134 Courts in the United States remain friendly
venues for litigation, and recoveries abroad seemingly do not reach the heights of U.S.
recoveries.135 The outcome of the first proceeding may affect (if not preclude)
relitigation, and relitigating plaintiffs will be seeking smaller expected returns while
sharing costs over a narrower base.136 Even for claims for which relitigation abroad is
plausible, there are reasons to worry about underdeterrence. Removing viable claims
may defeat the original class, either because of some formal requirement137 or because
litigation is not viable without the excluded class members.138 And, just because cases
are cost justified in foreign courts does not mean that foreign jurisdictions offer
equivalent levels of deterrence to U.S. substantive law.139

132. This situation parallels Professor Lahav’s observation that settlements may be
reduced because courts have loosened restrictions on certification of settlement classes as
compared with litigation classes. See Lahav, supra note 129, at 1498–99. For a discussion of
opportunities to reduce this problem in transnational class actions, see infra Part III.
133. See supra notes 49–62.
134. See supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that relitigation
risk may be lower than it appears).
135. See, e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
475 (3d ed. 2005).
136. This effect adds to the existing risk of underdeterrence resulting from systematic
underclaiming in class actions. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions
Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of
Financial Institutions To Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV.
411, 413 (2005).
137. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (numerosity).
138. Perhaps all putative claims are required to justify litigation costs, or option holders
possess particularly valuable claims. Admittedly, for positive-expected-value cases,
deterrence and compensation justifications are weaker (because these cases could proceed
individually), and governance problems are worse (because individual autonomy interests are
stronger). These arguments suggest caution generally in positive-value cases and, in practice,
U.S. courts have been fairly hostile to positive-value class actions. See, e.g., Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748–
49 (5th Cir. 1996). Still, even if claims are positive value in U.S. and foreign courts, a U.S.
court seeking to achieve U.S.-levels of deterrence, see infra note 139, or intent on vindicating
related smaller claims may include positive-value option holders in U.S. class actions.
139. Even if claims were viable in the foreign jurisdiction, a decision to exclude option
holders would result in underdeterrence if expected recoveries abroad are lower than in the
United States. In the unlikely event that expected recoveries are higher in the second forum,
see supra note 135, excluding class members could result in overdeterrence as measured
against U.S. recoveries. By binding even a subset of claimants, inclusion could help to
minimize this overdeterrence problem—that is, it could reduce the number and scope of viable
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2. Plaintiff Dynamics
Class actions also respond to collective-action problems among potential
plaintiffs.140 In a putative class action, each plaintiff would prefer to free ride on other
plaintiffs—each one wants a litigation option. Solving this collective-action problem
among plaintiffs is important for deterrence and compensation, and to ensure fairness
within the putative class.
Although it may seem that including option holders would be unfair to other
plaintiffs,141 the exclusion of otherwise plausible class members would create a class
of free riders. If option holders are included in the class, they share the costs of
litigation with other class members.142 But if option holders are excluded, they may
receive some benefits from a successful suit without contributing to litigation
expenses—the option holders could benefit from nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion143 or simply reuse the work done in the first case. In this respect, litigation
options in transnational class actions are less costly (and more fair) than options in
nonmutual estoppel cases like Parklane because litigation option holders share costs
while estoppel option holders do not.144 Nor is inclusion unfair to the option holders.
The class should operate in service of all U.S. claims,145 and all class members
(including option holders) retain their “voice” and “exit” rights.146 And, because they
retain the option to relitigate unless they affirmatively give it up, inclusion should

foreign cases (through preclusion or setoff) even if it does not eliminate relitigation
completely. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
141. See infra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing intraclass inequities).
142. In successful cases, option holders cash in, and attorney fees are paid out of the joint
recovery. In unsuccessful cases, the contingent-fee arrangement means that no class member
pays the costs of litigation. One might say that all plaintiffs are paying this cost in higher
contingency fees, but again those costs are shared among all plaintiffs—option holders and
non-option holders alike. See generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make
Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010).
143. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery, Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Excluded plaintiffs
could bring a new suit in a U.S. court and rely on a prior favorable judgment, or a foreign court
could treat the judgment as preclusive against the defendant (or as persuasive evidence against
the defendant’s case). See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
144. One could replicate this estoppel effect in class actions by opting out, and for this
reason, many courts will not allow opt-out plaintiffs to use estoppel in future cases. See 7AA
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 79, § 1789 (“The better view thus is that one who opts out of a
class action cannot claim [issue preclusion] benefits from the judgment.”). But see Antonio
Gidi, Loneliness in the Crowd: Why Nobody Wants Opt-Out Class Members To Assert
Offensive Issue Preclusion Against Class Defendants, 66 SMU L. REV. 1, 57 (2013)
(challenging this view).
145. An outcome should not be deemed inadequate because it does not compensate the
option holders for waiving relitigation. Similarly, Professor Woolley has explained that
adequacy of representation should be evaluated in light of the substantive remedial scheme.
Woolley, supra note 20, at 604–07.
146. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 376 (defining “exit” and “voice” mechanisms in class
actions).
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leave option holders no worse off than before.147
The foregoing discussion touches on issues of autonomy.148 Many scholarly
debates about class actions are understood as pitting those who are concerned with
litigant autonomy against those who are concerned with social values such as
deterrence.149 The fact that most of the attention in this Article is given to social
welfare should not be understood as relegating autonomy to second class. Instead,
this Article focuses on social values because choices about class definitions have
potentially profound effects on social outcomes, but whether German passive
plaintiffs are included or excluded has no effect on the due-process protections
afforded to all plaintiffs.150 Instead, the point here is that plaintiff interests, in
addition to social interests in deterrence, may support the inclusion of foreign option
holders in U.S. class actions.151
Current approaches that exclude option holders are ineffective at identifying the
class of plaintiffs likely to relitigate their cases in foreign courts. Courts rely on
citizenship when they should ask which plaintiffs may have cost-effective causes of
action, taking into account a host of judgments about foreign litigation opportunities.
Even if courts asked the right questions, their information and incentives to answer
these questions accurately are weak. At the same time, the exclusion of option
holders creates real costs to deterrence, compensation, and intraclass fairness. This
Article explained why relitigation in foreign courts may be unlikely (and uneven),
but disruptions to deterrence from excluding option holders are likely—putative
plaintiffs who lack individual incentives to sue abroad will not contribute to the social
deterrence function of law. Similarly, litigation costs are only shared among
participating class members.
For the reasons explained in this Part, a judge facing a transnational class action
should start from a default inclusionary rule. Of course, the court will make all sorts
of assessments about the viability of the class action and the process due its members,
but it should not simply exclude class members with litigation options. Again, this
approach is second-best, possibly sacrificing some preclusion as compared to a

147. This “do no harm” approach is common in this area. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh,
Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1177 (2009).
148. Exclusion of foreign plaintiffs also potentially touches on an equality norm because
it treats litigants differently based on citizenship. Courts would point to a neutral criterion—
litigation options—though this Article demonstrated that citizenship is not a perfect match for
optionality. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options, supra note 16, at 752–55
(discussing one such debate).
150. See Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, supra note 36, at 702–09; Issacharoff,
Governance and Legitimacy, supra note 20, at 353–66.
151. One interest not discussed here is judicial economy, which is often invoked as a
justification for preclusion. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery, Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)
(noting that preclusion law “promot[es] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation”).
The case for judicial economy is complicated by the class action mechanism, see Dam, supra
note 15, at 48, and it is not clear what effect excluding option holders would have on U.S. or
global judicial costs. And although excluding option holders will make some U.S. classes
nonviable, this would represent bare exchanges of judicial resources for deterrence and
compensation. Finally, the administrative costs of ascertaining which class members to exclude
are not trivial. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the challenges of identifying option holders).

2015]

TRANSNATIONAL CLASS ACTIONS

1413

full-faith-and-credit regime. To that end, once transnational classes are certified, the
next step is to identify other ways to achieve interjurisdictional preclusion. In the
next Part, this Article shows that private information and incentives can do this work
while remaining faithful to substantive remedial choices.
III. RESPONDING TO LITIGATION OPTIONS
The previous Part explained why courts should certify classes including foreign
plaintiffs despite the risk that some of them possess litigation options. This is not to
suggest, however, that litigation options are preferred. The challenge is identifying
valuable litigation options and responding without losing the social benefits of
aggregation. This Part describes approaches that respond to litigation options by
harnessing the incentives and information of private parties and targeting those
efforts toward preclusion (rather than toward aggregation). These approaches are not
perfect—as noted above, without interjurisdictional preclusion law, responses are at
most second best152—but they improve on judicial and scholarly proposals to date.
Subpart A reviews the core recommendation of a private-preclusion model.153
Subpart B discusses alternative approaches for concurrent proceedings, and Subpart
C addresses a few other permutations arising from particular features of
interjurisdictional litigation. These suggestions are framed as responses to litigation
asymmetries. Another way to view these suggestions, though, is as a continued
defense of including foreign option holders in transnational class actions. If parties
have mechanisms to limit the negative effects of relitigation risk, then we should be
even less willing to accept exclusion.154
The approaches described in this Part are post-dispute, meaning that they involve
party and court action after a cause of action accrues (and often after a case is filed).
Pre-dispute approaches also may be available in some cases. For example, with respect
to securities litigation, issuers may be able to include exclusive forum selection
provisions in corporate bylaws, avoiding litigation options by eliminating the second
forum (assuming that the second forum enforces the forum selection agreement).155 A

152. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
153. Subpart A offers what Cass Sunstein, drawing on Ronald Coase, has called “privately
adaptable rules.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 1020 (1995)
(citing R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 25–35
(1959)). These rules set initial entitlements, but they allow private flexibility to harness market
forces and counteract ex ante information asymmetries. Sunstein talked mostly about
substantive rules, but this concept is useful for procedural questions as well. For a discussion
of party-directed procedure, see generally Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making
Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2012).
154. Yet another way to view these approaches is as sources of information—if private
preclusion routinely appears in litigation involving Dutch parties, perhaps American and
Dutch policymakers should consider alternative responses such as regulatory coordination or
bilateral treaties. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (discussing treaties and
concurrent jurisdiction); see also Vaughan Black, A Canada-United States Full Faith and
Credit Clause?, 18 SW. J. INT’L LAW 595, 618–23 (2012) (proposing a bilateral U.S.-Canada
judgment recognition treaty).
155. See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem,
100 VA. L. REV. 261, 297–303 (2014). Importantly, in some contexts a post-dispute agreement
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similar approach could exist in other areas in which plaintiffs and defendants have
pre-dispute relationships.156 Nothing in this Article should be read to undermine these
approaches. Indeed, they are welcomed both as responses to litigation options and as
further evidence that the risk of relitigation may be overstated.
A. Private Preclusion
A private response to litigation optionality relies on what this Subpart calls
“private preclusion.”157 Before discussing the merits and mechanics of private
preclusion, it is helpful to begin with a stylized version of this approach. This story
is illustrative: it necessarily blurs some details, and it is but one example of how
private preclusion might take shape.
Imagine a class action filed in a U.S. court in which some subset of plaintiffs may
have causes of action in Canada, Austria, or Germany. For the reasons described in
the previous Part, the U.S. judge certifies the class even though foreign courts may
not treat the U.S. judgment as binding on passive plaintiffs. At the time of
certification,158 defendant approaches plaintiffs’ counsel to negotiate a private
preclusion agreement. In this particular (hypothetical) case, defendant concludes that

will fare better than a pre-dispute one. See infra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing
European approaches).
156. For just one example, consider the cell phone contract and its corresponding
(enforceable) arbitration agreement. See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A
Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 78 (2011).
157. This Subpart’s treatment of class-action practice as a market transaction is not novel.
As Professor Rubenstein put it:
The core premise of the transactional model is that complex multiparty litigation
resembles a transaction more than it resembles a conventional adversarial
lawsuit. What is bought and sold are rights-to-sue. . . . A second reason that class
actions are profitably conceptualized as ‘deals’ is that this best describes what
the attorneys do in such cases. Most of the action in the class action is in the
transactional aspects of the deal—what is offered, what is accepted, on what
terms, for what consideration. . . . The primary function that complex class action
attorneys undertake is structuring large financial transactions.
Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 419–20 (internal citations omitted); see also supra note 15
(collecting transactional scholarship).
Some readers might object to this commodification of litigation, and such objections have
been leveled against other authors writing in this vein. A common response is that transactional
approaches are descriptive, not normative. E.g., Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 431 (“The
transactional model [of class actions] is an explanatory device and pedagogical tool, not a
normative proposal. The model does not suggest that this is what lawyers and judges should be
doing, so much as it characterizes what they are doing in certain large, important cases.”). But
advocating for a private approach to preclusion law, I must concede that I am adding some
normative content to this descriptive baseline. In part, this emphasis is justified—the market is
one institution that can solve public policy problems, and it should be used when appropriate. I
would hasten to add that I have not advocated a market solution for market’s sake. Indeed, I have
suggested above that a public approach (i.e., an international treaty) might be preferable.
158. As explained below, private preclusion also may be proposed at settlement or
judgment. See infra notes 168–69.
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the risk of relitigation in an Austrian court is high, so the agreement provides
Austrian option holders159 with a promise of a thirty percent premium on top of the
U.S. recovery in exchange for a release of their claims in Austrian courts.160 Because
defendant believes the risk of relitigation in German courts is lower, defendant offers
only a ten percent premium to German option holders. And because defendant is
confident that Canadian courts will recognize the U.S. judgment, no private
preclusion offer is extended to Canadian option holders.
Attorneys for both parties agree on the wording of these offers, and then the court
notifies option holders of the private preclusion offer using the normal procedure for
sending opt-out notices.161 Although the offers are negotiated on a subclass-wide basis,
individualized consent would be required to release the foreign claims and qualify for
the premium recovery.162 Plaintiffs’ counsel (whose fee may be increased if the total
recovery is increased) and defendant (who seeks to avoid costly relitigation) work
together to identify option holders and encourage them to take the deal.
After the period for accepting the offer closes, the case proceeds along the
standard path. If defendant wins a dismissal, then any option holder who signed the
release will be bound by that judgment. If plaintiffs win (or settle), then those
plaintiffs who signed the private preclusion agreements will receive additional
compensation on top of the baseline recovery. Again, any plaintiff who signed a
release will not be able to relitigate their case abroad, even if the U.S. recovery is
lower than they hoped. And importantly, any plaintiff who signed a release also could
not be a passive member of a foreign opt-out class action, which may present the
most serious risk of cost-effective relitigation.163
This stylized version of private preclusion reveals potential advantages of a
private approach to litigation options. Unlike the exclusion remedy described above,
private preclusion relies on parties rather than judges to identify which option holders
matter. The parties may have private information about relitigation risk unavailable
to courts, and they have incentives to acquire that information.164 Thus, defendants
can make a case-by-case assessment of the risk of relitigation and only then approach
plaintiffs with a private preclusion proposal.165

159. “Austrian option holders” refers to plaintiffs with causes of action in Austria, not
Austrian-citizen plaintiffs. See supra Part II.A.
160. The release also could be worded to release all claims in any court (not only
Austrian courts).
161. If the agreement occurs at disposition, then presumably the court would use the
analogous notification method. See infra notes 168–69. And, as described below, the parties
may supplement the notice as needed. See infra Part III.C.
162. See infra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing individualized consent).
163. See infra note 168.
164. See supra Part III.A (discussing this issue). Recall that current judicial and scholarly
approaches rely on judges to identify option holders. See supra Part II (collecting judicial and
scholarly sources). Simard and Tidmarsh most directly focus on the informational challenge,
but they too rely on courts. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 124–28.
165. One potential caution with respect to private preclusion is a concern with negative
signaling—that is, the notion that defendants might worry that any offer would signal a weak
case or a willingness to settle. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the
Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 661 (2006) (explaining how negative
signaling results in sticky defaults). The fact that offers can be a multiplier of future recovery
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Private preclusion is also more flexible than exclusion. Courts have only crude
tools to respond to option holders—they can certify or not certify classes with foreign
option holders, and they can approve or reject proposed settlements. But private
parties have continuous rather than discrete choices. As a result, not only can parties
price preclusion more accurately, but they can also act on that information with
calibrated offers, such as the proposal to offer thirty percent to Austrian option
holders and ten percent to German option holders.166
The role of consent is also important for the efficacy of this approach. Individual
consent blunts some foreign objections to the opt-out class action. Whether made at
the time of certification,167 settlement,168 or judgment,169 private preclusion
agreements are consensual, postdispute contracts, which should fare much better in
foreign courts.170 At the same time, this proposal presumptively includes option

means that a preclusion offer need not come with a negative signal about the underlying merits,
nor is it obvious that a defendant willing to make such a contingent offer would be more or
less likely to settle the entire case. It is true that a private preclusion offer sends a signal that
some plaintiffs may have causes of action in other courts, but it should hardly surprise an
Austrian plaintiff (or an Austrian plaintiffs’ attorney) that she may be able to sue in her home
court. Finally, private preclusion offers are voluntary, and if a defendant believes that the
signal value trumps the savings from avoiding relitigation, so be it.
166. Prior scholarship has highlighted efforts by defendants to discourage opt outs—in
other words, negotiating for preclusion. Professor Nagareda helpfully categorized methods by
which defendants seek to reduce opt outs in class settlements. Nagareda, Preexistence
Principle, supra note 16, at 205–19. Professor Rave also noted at least one case, In re World
Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), in which a defendant
included “bonus payments,” increasing the per capita settlement value if certain thresholds of
participation were met. D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (2013).
167. This Part began with a certification example. See supra notes 158–63 and
accompanying text. Notably, agreements at certification are effective if the outcome is a
settlement, judgment for plaintiffs, or judgment for defendant.
168. Class-action settlements may not be sufficient to bar relitigation because they do not
require individualized consent and not all passive plaintiffs will claim on the settlement fund.
See supra note 136 (describing underclaiming). Thus, defendants could offer private
preclusion on top of the baseline settlement amount to induce additional consent. Although
one might think that passive plaintiffs who do not claim on the settlement fund are also not
likely to relitigate abroad, passive plaintiffs who do not file claims remain setoff-free
candidates for opt-out class actions in foreign forums.
169. Courts could impose preclusion terms on judgment claims, requiring that plaintiffs
sign releases consonant with that jurisdiction’s preclusion law in order to claim on the
judgment fund. Cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (“[T]he court
may reasonably require any individual who claims under its judgment [for the government] to
relinquish his right to bring a separate private action.”). These judicial releases should track
the full-faith-and-credit approach described above. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying
text. Defendants also could propose private preclusion offers to effect notice to plaintiffs of
final judgments.
170. Private preclusion agreements are not contracts of adhesion; they are negotiated after
the claim arises; and they necessarily allow for vindication of rights because they permit the
U.S. class action to proceed. Cf. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304,
2014–20 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
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holders in the class. Thus, unlike opt-in mechanisms,171 private preclusion
agreements allow courts to capture the benefits of aggregation while separately
working to reduce costly relitigation.172
Of course, this private approach to preclusion will work only if agreements create
value for both sides and if plaintiffs actively consent. First, it is important to
acknowledge the transaction costs of negotiating private-preclusion offers, though
these costs will be reduced because defendants will make subclass-wide offers,173
rather than negotiating individualized contracts with every class member.174
Moreover, private-preclusion agreements need not reduce transaction costs to zero
to create value for the parties.175 Instead, if the costs of negotiation are less than the
cost of litigation in the second court, there should be a zone of agreement that allows
both sides to benefit.176 And, if fees for class counsel in the first case could be linked

1760–61 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In this sense, private-preclusion agreements appear
more like post-filing forum selection (or arbitration) agreements, and this type of consent is
typically respected in U.S. and foreign jurisdictions. For example, the limitations on forum
selection clauses in employment, insurance, and consumer contracts in E.U. law are subject to
an exception for post-dispute agreements. See Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December
2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters arts. 13, 17, 21, 2000 O.J. (L 12) (EC). More generally, with sufficient
time and incentive, attorneys would likely be able to craft agreements, signed by both parties
after the dispute arose, that would be binding in foreign courts. Indeed, this is the business of
settlements and releases.
171. In this way, private preclusion agreements do not undermine the viability of a U.S.
class, unlike settlements that “buy off” named plaintiffs in order to moot the case, see, e.g.,
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 340 (1980), or settlements with high-value
claimants that unravel the class, see, e.g., Bone, supra note 121, at 599–600 (discussing this
possibility). But these techniques could target foreign relitigation.
172. Note also that because litigants retain control of their cases, this proposal does not run
afoul of rules that prohibit selling claims. See generally Max Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48 (1935); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of
Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159 (2011).
173. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)–(5) (issue classes and subclasses). Whether we call them
subclasses or not, a settlement with a transnational class could involve different payouts
depending on the likelihood of relitigation.
174. This is not to suggest that defendants may only offer one deal per case. But in no case
would defendants negotiate individualized offers with individual plaintiffs. See supra note
171. Of course, when transaction costs are too high, defendants can elect to proceed under
current preclusion law. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
175. The economic justification for preclusion law over private preclusion is that negotiating
private agreements is too expensive. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 239 (2002); Hay, supra note 31, at 24. But here, preclusion law is not available.
176. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1267
(1995) (“[W]hen litigation costs and outcome risks are high, the zone of settlement is
correspondingly larger.”). In this way, private preclusion may transfer value from unique
players in the second court—attorneys and courts in future cases—to the parties in the first
proceeding. For a discussion of the social utility of litigation waivers and arbitration
agreements, see generally Keith N. Hylton, Agreements To Waive or To Arbitrate Legal
Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209 (2000).
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to class recovery,177 then those attorneys will have incentives to work with
defendants to identify value-enhancing agreements, negotiate their terms, and market
them to option holders.178 Private-preclusion agreements also may tap into party
preferences. In other contexts, defendants have been known to offer “peace
premiums” to buy the certainty and efficiency of global settlement, and there may be
some defendants that prefer a certain outcome in these cases.179 And unlike opt-in
regimes, defendants here have incentives to make the notices effective.
Another advantage of private preclusion is that it may reduce the value of future
foreign litigation. Every plaintiff that signs a private preclusion agreement is one
fewer member of a foreign class action or other aggregate litigation.180 This reduces
the value of foreign relitigation, which encourages more plaintiffs to join private
preclusion. And eventually, enough plaintiffs could agree to make foreign relitigation
untenable. Indeed, defendants could price preclusion offers just high enough to
achieve this outcome—creating separation among plaintiffs based on their claim
size, attention to the case, risk aversion, or other criteria.181
Two additional concerns should be dealt with here: agency costs and intraclass
inequity. First, readers may be concerned that a proposal that enlists class counsel to
help defendants buy preclusion exacerbates the agency problem between attorney
and class. Agency costs are endemic to class proceedings182 but they are costs that
lawmakers have been willing to bear, and steps have been taken to ameliorate these
costs through judicial supervision of representation183 and settlement.184 Further
work on agency costs in class actions is needed, but it would not single out litigation
options. With respect to private preclusion in particular, class counsel should profit
only if she increases plaintiff recovery—principal and agent incentives should be

177. As the Ninth Circuit recently said, “Courts try to ensure faithful representation by . . .
tether[ing] the value of an attorneys’ fees award to the value of the class recovery.” In re HP
Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013). Indeed, the size of the recovery fund
is the best predictor of attorney fees regardless of the fee formula used. Theodore Eisenberg
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 76 (2004).
178. This suggestion might raise concerns that class counsel and defendants will collude
at the expense of class interests. This issue is discussed later in this Subpart. See infra notes
182–86 and accompanying text.
179. See Rave, supra note 166, at 1193–95 (discussing these reasons and others).
180. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
181. For example, it may be that a certain number of foreign claimants (or a certain total
claim value) are necessary to qualify for aggregation. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (numerosity).
Or, it may be that a certain number of active plaintiffs are necessary to make the case
cost-effective. See supra note 171. Even if the foreign jurisdiction has opt-out mechanisms,
the effective value of the foreign judgment will depend on the number of actual claims on the
judgment fund. But these divide-and-conquer strategies operate against a background in which
all plaintiffs retain their causes of action in U.S. courts. See supra note 170.
182. See Macey & Miller, supra note 127, at 19–27. See generally Hay & Rosenberg, supra
note 30; Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy, supra note 20; Samuel Issacharoff & John
Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American
Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004).
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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aligned.185 And if class counsel is unwilling to expend the effort to increase class
recovery, courts could assign separate representation to option holders for purposes
of private preclusion.186
Second, readers also might worry that private preclusion is unfair because some
option holders may do better than other plaintiffs. As a descriptive matter, this is of
course correct—even if private preclusion is uncommon, in certain cases defendants
may compensate some plaintiffs more than others. Notably, these intraclass
differences are the product of substantive law. Legislative choices, not procedural
ones, produce any unequal treatment.187 Further, these inequities would exist whether
or not private preclusion were available, and if preclusion is priced right, option
holders obtain no greater return (and defendants pay no greater amount) than possible
under current law. More mechanically, private-preclusion offers should not give
option holders larger stakes in common-fund judgments,188 but instead should
obligate defendants to pay on top of baseline recoveries. Finally, and connected with
the previous discussion of representation, if class counsel cannot adequately
represent the interests of all plaintiffs,189 then courts may assign separate
representation for negotiating private preclusion.190

185. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
186. The threat of separate representation may encourage original class counsel to pursue
more cost-justified participants. Class counsel also could help avoid future foreign relitigation
by contracting with potential foreign counsel to handle option-holder contact.
187. For example, it is the Securities Exchange Act, not a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,
that determines whether investors on foreign exchanges have viable causes of action in U.S.
courts. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
188. Common-fund judgments involve a court awarding a fixed amount of damages to a
pool of claimants. See John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from
Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (1974).
189. See supra notes 141–47.
190. Another potential objection looks to foreign law. If foreign parties fare better when
their home country refuses to enforce U.S. judgments, then perhaps it would be in foreign
states’ interest not to recognize U.S. judgments. In this way, an exclusionary approach operates
as a modified reciprocity rule. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). However, it is doubtful that an
exclusionary approach would be particularly effective in changing foreign-state behavior. As
Professor Coyle’s political-economy analysis suggests, reciprocity affects behavior if it targets
concentrated interests, but exclusion here would target diffuse, unorganized option holders.
See John F. Coyle, Rethinking Judgments Reciprocity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1109, 1131–43 (2014).
At the same time, potential defendants also may be foreign citizens, and likely would lobby
against such a rule. See, e.g., Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (German
defendant); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (French
defendant); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 219 F.R.D. 343 (D. Md. 2003)
(Dutch defendant).
Domestically, the same political-economy argument could augur in favor of aggregating
option holders because defendants would have better luck overturning a pro-aggregation rule
than disaggregated plaintiffs would have in establishing one. See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE,
STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 168–87 (2008); NEIL
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 53–97 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
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To summarize briefly, private preclusion may be a viable response to some
litigation options. At a minimum, it shifts responsibility for identifying option
holders to parties with better information, and the responses to options can be
continuous rather than discrete. Private preclusion aligns the incentives of defendants,
plaintiffs, and class counsel, and it allows the parties with the best information to value
preclusion in each suit. Contrary to traditional notions of opt-in, which make
participation (and deterrence) contingent on consent, private preclusion preserves the
social benefits of aggregation in every case and makes preclusion available when most
valuable to the parties. For many cases, asking defendants to put a price on preclusion
will reveal that it is of little or no value—relitigation may not be a true threat.191 But
for those cases in which relitigation matters, private preclusion can respond
proportionally, pricing preclusion to the case at hand.192
B. Concurrent Proceedings
Concurrent proceedings also may present avenues for increased preclusion. Most
of the discussion so far has addressed a class action filed in a single jurisdiction. But
if enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys in different jurisdictions see the same promising
case, each might choose to file an overlapping class action in a different court.
“Dueling class actions”193 have drawn attention in the domestic setting, particularly
with respect to the reverse-auction problem. As Professors Coffee and Wasserman,
among others, have explained, if different class counsel file concurrent cases
representing the same class, defendants can bid them against each other with the carrot
of an attorney-fee award.194 Individual plaintiffs may lack incentives to monitor
counsel effectively, and courts only hear about settlement after it is negotiated.195
The reverse-auction problem exists in transnational dueling class actions as well,
but the presence of litigation options may actually mitigate this problem and allow
courts to increase the preclusive effect of judgments. Domestic dueling class actions
create significant reverse-auction problems because full faith and credit permits a
judicially enforced settlement in one state to be preclusive in other states’ courts.196

REV. 593, 631 (1992); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution,
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 105, 131 (1997).
191. For a discussion of some of the reasons (beyond transaction costs) that these
agreements may have not materialized to date, see supra note 62. And for further discussion
of transactions costs, see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
192. Private preclusion also may be available in domestic cases in which preclusion is
uncertain. For example, if defendants worry about collateral attack in domestic class actions,
preclusion agreements could be worth the cost of negotiation. See supra Part II.B (discussing
other domestic litigation options). For an alternative discussion of preclusion bargaining, see
Alan M. Trammell, Transactionalism Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 1211, 1245–68 (2014).
193. See Wasserman, supra note 14. Wasserman deals with dueling domestic class actions:
federal-state, federal-federal, and state-state. Id. Her article does not address transnational
dueling class actions, though many of its insights are relevant to these cases as well.
194. Id.; see also, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1354 (1995); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of
the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 853–54 (1995).
195. See supra Part II.A (discussing judicial information problems).
196. See supra note 34.
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But because there is no international full-faith-and-credit rule, both courts would
need to review the settlement before enforcing it. And importantly, the second judge
may have access to better information about the merits of the settlement than the first
judge who endorsed it. In the first case, defendant and class counsel have an interest
in getting the settlement approved with the least possible effort. Thus, they will
present the first judge with information slanted toward approval.197 But in a second
(foreign) court, the judge will hear from an expert objector—class counsel from the
second case—with incentives to highlight shortcomings in the settlement.198
Litigation options, therefore, help judicial review of class settlements to be an
adversarial process rather than a collusive one. The mere presence of this
second-order review also could deter particularly egregious, collusive settlements.199
The recent IMAX securities litigation provides a useful example of how these
dynamics could be used to increase preclusion.200 Canadian and American investors
in IMAX sued the company for securities fraud in U.S. and Canadian courts.201 Both
the U.S. and Canadian proceedings involved classes of U.S. and Canadian purchasers
who purchased securities on U.S. and Canadian exchanges.202 Motions practice,
discovery, and settlement negotiations proceeded in parallel until parties to the
U.S.-side of the litigation reached a settlement. Instead of entering judgment right
away, however, the U.S. court made its endorsement contingent on preapproval by
the Canadian court.203 The Canadian court approved the U.S. settlement after hearing
objections from Canadian class counsel.204 Only then did the U.S. court enter
judgment.205 In this way, the preclusive effect of the U.S. ruling was known before
it was finalized,206 and private incentives facilitated a twice-reviewed outcome
binding in both the United States and Canada.

197. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing this dynamic).
198. See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 482–83 (making a similar informational point for
domestic dueling class actions).
199. See also infra Part IV (discussing due-process review). Again, because of the absence
of full-faith-and-credit obligations, transnational class actions may respond better to the
reverse-auction problem than domestic counterparts. And because relitigation is perhaps most
likely in jurisdictions with opt-out class actions, this approach may be available in cases
creating the most serious threats.
200. See In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 283 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re IMAX Sec. Litig.,
272 F.R.D. 138, 142–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474–78
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Silver v. IMAX Corp., 2013 ONSC 1667 (Can.); Silver v. IMAX Corp., (2012)
110 O.R. 3d 425 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Silver v. IMAX Corp., (2011) 105 O.R. 3d 212 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Silver v. IMAX Corp., [2009] O.J. No. 5585 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL).
201. In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 283 F.R.D. at 181.
202. The classes were overlapping but not coextensive. See, e.g., Silver v. IMAX Corp.,
2013 ONSC 1667 (Can.).
203. Technically, the U.S. court made its settlement approval contingent on amendment of
the Canadian class definition to exclude all plaintiffs purportedly bound by the U.S. decision.
See In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 283 F.R.D. at 184.
204. See Silver, 2013 ONSC at 1667.
205. In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 283 F.R.D. at 188–93.
206. Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A court conducting an action cannot predetermine
the res judicata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested only in a subsequent action.”).
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C. Other Approaches
Private-preclusion and dueling-class resolutions are just two ways courts may
use private incentives and information to supplement preclusion law. But they are
not alone, and courts and parties should be encouraged to innovate new techniques
where possible.
For example, parties have incentives not only to identify foreign courts that create
the threat of relitigation,207 but also to learn the specific requirements for recognition
in those jurisdictions. Courts should explore with parties those procedural steps that
could increase the likelihood of preclusion abroad and allow defendants to fund such
protections if they choose to do so. It may be, for example, that a relevant foreign
court would recognize a U.S. judgment if notice of opt-out rights were effected in a
particular manner.208 Defendants should be permitted to fund this notice, subject to
court supervision.209 Alternatively, if a foreign court permits representative litigation
only for certain classes of claims or organizations, defendants could investigate how
those regimes could integrate with judgment-recognition procedures.210
More generally, parties should be creative in thinking through responses to
litigation options, and courts should entertain those responses rather than simply
rejecting option holders out of hand.211 Exclusion is not the only way to preserve the
preclusive effect of U.S. judgments abroad.

207. This assessment involves judgments about both foreign law and the particulars of the case.
208. See, e.g., Currie v. McDonald’s Rests. of Can. Ltd., (2005) 74 O.R. 3d 321 (Can. Ont.
C.A.) (rejecting U.S. class judgment on the basis of notice). Or, the method of service may be
the issue. In many civil-law countries, service of process is a public act to be completed by
public officials, while signatory states to the Hague Service Convention have consented only
to certain forms of international service. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS ch. 10 (5th ed. 2011).
209. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (regarding notice). Similarly, if the form of settlement or
judgment notice is relevant to foreign recognition, defendants should be permitted to pay for
those notices as well.
210. See Clopton, supra note 6 (citing examples of representative litigation). Many
European states allow consumer associations to bring claims on behalf of consumers. See
generally Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member
States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409 (2009). Perhaps defendants
could induce such consumer associations to agree to private preclusion or to participate in
parallel recognition proceedings.
211. Perhaps courts should look to litigation-funding contracts (in jurisdictions that permit
them). These contracts create binding obligations on funders and class members, and those
obligations could be leveraged into private preclusion. See supra note 101 and accompanying
text. Or perhaps arbitration mechanisms—and concomitant international obligations to
enforce arbitral awards—could play a role in bolstering judicial resolutions or private
preclusion. The New York Convention establishes international obligations to enforce arbitral
awards, and many arbitral proceedings permit settlement-like awards. See supra note 74; see,
e.g., U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION art. 30, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008) (describing “arbitral
award on agreed terms”).
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IV. RECOGNIZING TRANSNATIONAL JUDGMENTS
So far this Article has explored methods to link procedure to substantive-law
values by aggregating foreign class members and working to achieve additional
preclusion in the absence of international law. This Part considers briefly the other
side of the coin: defendants requesting recognition of a foreign court’s aggregate
judgment in a U.S. court.212 It is only a matter of time before U.S. courts will need
to make decisions about the preclusive effects of aggregate judgments that are
literally and figuratively foreign to U.S. courts.213 Earlier discussions have explored
many of the issues at stake in these cases but here they must be wedded with domestic
approaches to judgment recognition.214
In responding to foreign aggregate judgments, two paradigms of preclusion policy
in U.S. courts may be implicated: recognition of foreign judgments and recognition
of domestic class judgments. American foreign-judgment recognition practice is
fairly liberal, and U.S. courts will enforce foreign judgments provided minimal
due-process requirements were met.215 Although most judgment recognition is a
matter of state law, these rules have coalesced around the federal rule announced in
Hilton v. Guyot in 1895.216 Foreign judgments must meet due-process standards,

212. The Netherlands, for example, has adopted an approach that is opt-out and open to
foreign and domestic plaintiffs, but strikingly permits opt-out settlement without providing for
opt-out litigation. Thus, Dutch courts purport to preclude domestic and foreign plaintiffs from
relitigating cases based on opt-out settlements even though the class could not have gone to
trial in Dutch courts. See Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade [WCAM 2005]
[Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Act], codified at BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [CIVIL
CODE], art. 7:907–10 (Neth.), and WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [RV]
[CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], art. 1013; see also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 15; VAN LITH,
supra note 97. On the other hand, many Latin American courts allow class-like litigation that
binds passive plaintiffs only if they win. See Antonio Gidi, The Recognition of U.S. Class
Action Judgments Abroad: The Case of Latin America, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 893, 910–22
(2012) (collecting examples).
213. One such foreign judgment nearly appeared in the Shell securities litigation: the U.S.
court avoided passing on the Dutch judgment because it dismissed foreign claimants for failing
to state a claim. In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig. (“Shell II”), 522 F. Supp. 2d 712
(D.N.J. 2007); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig. (“Shell I”), 380 F. Supp. 2d 509
(D.N.J. 2005); see Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions
and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 313–20 (2011);
Palmisciano, supra note 62, at 1875–76; see also Clopton, supra note 6 (describing foreign
procedures for aggregate litigation and collecting sources).
214. This Part relies on U.S. law, but a similar analysis could apply to foreign legal
systems.
215. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 208. Importantly, U.S. courts will enforce foreign
default judgments, meaning that appearance in a foreign court is not a prerequisite for
recognition. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481, cmt. i & rep. n.4
(1987); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, cmt. d (1971).
216. According to Hilton:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before
a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular
proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant,
and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
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along with satisfying the public-policy exception217 and systemic fairness review.218
But U.S. courts do not require foreign procedures to mirror U.S. ones exactly,219 and
the due-process review requires less than in domestic cases—sometimes called an
“international concept of due process.”220 This approach protects due process while
also realizing other values such as efficiency, economy, and comity.
The second judgment-recognition paradigm is the domestic class action. At the
highest level of generality, class action judgments are binding to the same extent as
traditional judgments.221 And just as traditional judgments must meet the
requirements of due process,222 so too must class judgments.223 In Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court explained that passive plaintiffs in class actions are
not entitled to the same protections as defendants, but passive plaintiffs are entitled
to more protection than active plaintiffs.224 In addition to Shutts’s “minimal due

administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those
of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in
procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this
nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in
an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on
a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1895).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 & cmt. c (1971); UNIF.
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UFMJRA) § 4(b)(3) (1962).
218. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202; see also UFMJRA § 4(a)(1).
219. As Judge Cardozo observed, “We are not so provincial as to say that every solution
of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.” Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
220. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that
foreign judgments would be enforced if they satisfied an “international concept of due
process,” even if the foreign court system “has not adopted every jot and tittle of American
due process”).
221. See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court stated in
Cooper, “There is of course no dispute that under elementary principles of prior adjudication
a judgment in a properly entertained class action is binding on class members in any
subsequent litigation.” Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984).
222. See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228–29 (1946) (“A [sister-state] judgment
obtained in violation of procedural due process is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued
upon in another jurisdiction.”).
223. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–14 (1985).
224. According to Shutts, for personal jurisdiction to obtain for a non-resident passive
plaintiff:
[He or she] must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and
participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel. The
notice must be the best practicable, “reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” The notice
should describe the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it. Additionally, we
hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by
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process,” case law has limited the preclusive effect of class resolutions on absentees
through what one scholar called the “class action gloss.”225 The exact contours of this
gloss are not relevant here. Instead, the general point is that courts have found various
doctrinal pathways to respond to the differences between individual and class
resolution.226 In sum, class actions are preclusive with respect to passive plaintiffs
provided they were afforded “minimal due process” and as limited by the “class
action gloss.”227 Again, this preclusion policy combines due-process concerns with
other values implicated by prior adjudication.
These two approaches point toward a set of principles for foreign aggregate
judgments. A natural synthesis of Hilton and class-preclusion law suggests that
foreign aggregate judgments should be recognized as binding on passive plaintiffs,
provided that due-process requirements are satisfied. Those due-process
requirements, as in Hilton and Shutts, are not identical to the due process required
for domestic two-party litigation, but instead reflect the fundamental requirements of
notice, opportunity to be heard, and adequate representation: “international” or
“minimal” due process.228
This synthesis is supported and elaborated by the approach of this Article. Earlier
discussion highlighted the importance of looking to the source of substantive rights
when thinking about preclusion and aggregation.229 Here, courts should be more
deferential to foreign procedural choices for claims brought under foreign
substantive law, since those procedural doctrines represent background or
implementing principles of the foreign state’s substantive policy choices.230

executing and returning an “opt out” or “request for exclusion” form to
the court. Finally, the Due Process Clause of course requires that the
named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent
class members.
Id. at 812 (internal citations omitted); see also Wolff, supra note 33, at 2072–117 (discussing
Shutts, jurisdiction, and due process). Prior to Shutts, future-Judge Diane Wood explained that,
at least with respect to “representational” class actions (e.g., low-value, public-law claims),
personal jurisdiction over named plaintiffs should be sufficient to issue a judgment binding all
class members. Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597,
620 (1987). For joinder-style class actions (e.g., high-value claims joined for efficiency),
consent or minimum contacts would be required for all plaintiffs. Id.; see also supra note 138
(discussing positive-value claims).
225. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 490–92; Wasserman, supra note 43, at 322–30.
Professor Wasserman, of course, is not the only scholar to have noted this phenomenon. See
generally 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 79, § 4455; Hazard et al., supra note 20; Wolff,
supra note 123.
226. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 79, § 4455. Professor Wasserman suggested that
practicality and due process justify the gloss. See Wasserman, supra note 43, at 323–25.
227. Notably, this conception of due process has some characteristics of a
personal-jurisdiction analysis and some characteristics of other due-process concerns. See,
e.g., Monaghan, supra note 98, at 1166–75 (observing this dual character in Shutts). One could
say the same thing about the “international concept of due process” applied to foreign
judgments. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
228. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 797–842; Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476–82.
229. See supra Part II.B.
230. This approach accords with the view of Casad, Burbank, and others, that foreign
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The “class action gloss” provides an important point of comparison. In Cooper v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the Supreme Court held that Title VII plaintiffs
could bring individual discrimination suits despite a prior adjudication of a “pattern
or practice” class action.231 As Professor Wolff persuasively explained, the Cooper
decision is in many respects a decision about Title VII—it is a case addressing a
federal-law claim in federal court, subject to the federal preclusion law, and resolved
with direct reference to federal substantive policies involved in that statute.232 In
other words, preclusion and aggregation are inextricably intertwined with the source
of substantive law and the policy judgments that underlie it. To link substance and
procedure in transnational cases, foreign procedures should be treated more
deferentially in cases applying foreign substantive law. And U.S. courts should be
more willing to question foreign procedural choices for U.S.-law claims.233
Despite these presumptions, plaintiffs may bring due-process challenges against
foreign two-party judgments and against domestic class judgments, and such
challenges should be permitted against foreign class actions as well.234 Earlier
discussions shed further light on this view. First, it is important to recall that the
denial of interjurisdictional preclusion is not terminal for the original aggregate
litigation. This Article explained that U.S. class actions could proceed despite
uncertain preclusion abroad, and, similarly, U.S. courts should not shy away from
collateral attacks merely because they may have consequences for foreign aggregate
proceedings. Even if the U.S. court is evaluating a foreign-court judgment applying
foreign law, it should not feel obligated to sacrifice due process in order to eliminate
litigation options from foreign proceedings.235 In addition, judgment recognition may
link up with private preclusion. Private agreements involve individualized consent,
so parties to foreign-court preclusion agreements should receive fewer benefits from
collateral review than passive plaintiffs. A private-preclusion gloss to recognition

judgments should be given the preclusive effect entitled under the law of the rendering state—
no more and no less. See supra note 71.
231. 467 U.S. 867, 881 (1984).
232. Wolff, supra note 123, at 726–31. As Professor Wolff put it, “Cooper, in short, is a Title
VII opinion, not an opinion about the preclusive effects of class action judgments.” Id. at 730.
233. In other words, U.S. courts should be more willing to allow relitigation of U.S.-law
claims when in service of U.S. substantive law’s goals.
234. Following Shutts, Professor Monaghan rightly worried about the rendering court’s
ability, through preclusion or injunction, to prohibit passive plaintiffs from bringing
due-process challenges in the second court. Monaghan, supra note 98, at 1179–87.
235. In Matsushita, the Supreme Court held that, pursuant to Delaware law, a Delaware
opt-out settlement precluded passive plaintiffs’ securities claims that were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts (i.e., outside the jurisdiction of the Delaware state court).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 386–87 (1996). Two points from
Matsushita are relevant here. First, Matsushita acknowledged that Delaware preclusion law
governed the preclusive effect of a Delaware judgment. Id. at 373. The same approach makes
sense in international litigation. See supra notes 71, 230. Second, preclusion of passive
plaintiffs depends on a finding of due process, which includes a finding of adequacy.
Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 378–79. Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion in Matsushita explained
that such an inquiry may happen on collateral attack in the putative recognizing court. Id. at
395–99 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That is exactly the inquiry
described here.
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also gives parties in foreign litigation incentives to determine the price of relitigation
in a U.S. court and negotiate accordingly.
CONCLUSION
A perennial question in the study of international litigation is what, if anything, is
different about international cases.236 This Article contributes to that debate in two
respects. First, this Article identifies an important aspect of international litigation
that may be different: the lack of an international law of preclusion means that there
is a risk of litigation options in transnational litigation. Litigation options create
asymmetries between parties and within putative classes and thus may upset
legislative choices. Because these options may be more prevalent in international
litigation, they unsurprisingly have led courts and commentators to propose
internationally focused solutions—that is, excluding foreign citizens from class
actions in U.S. courts.
The second contribution of this Article cuts back against these claims. Although
transnational litigation may be different in the frequency with which it presents
litigation options, the responses to those options should draw on the same values as
presented in domestic cases. To begin with, aggregation and preclusion do not stand
apart. Instead, they must be integrated with substantive law choices on issues such
as deterrence, compensation, and fairness. The mere presence of litigation options
should not, as some have implied, throw those choices out the window.
When seeking to supplement the preclusion applicable to option holders,
transnational litigation also can take advantage of litigation dynamics not unique to
international cases. In litigation, transnational or otherwise, parties may have the best
information about the strength of the case, the likely course of litigation (or
relitigation), and the value of preclusion. Aligning their incentives should have the
effect of identifying the market price for preclusion, which can manifest in private
agreements that achieve what international law cannot (at least to date). Judges,
meanwhile, lack the information and incentives to price preclusion right, not to
mention the fact that their tools to respond to litigation options are blunt and
imprecise. Not only should transnational class actions look to the same systemic
values in order to weigh aggregation and preclusion, but they also may use the same
sets of private and public tools to fill gaps in international law.
Indeed, because litigation options are not unique to transnational cases (though
they are saliently presented in them), the lessons for responding to transnational
litigation options may be valuable for domestic cases as well. Domestic litigation
options may arise from nonmutual preclusion doctrine, collateral attacks on domestic
class judgments, serial class certification motions, or unpredictable judgments about

236. For a discussion about this question in connection with Born and Rutledge’s
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 208, see generally Samuel P.
Baumgartner, Transnational Litigation in the United States: The Emergence of a New Field of
Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 793 (2007) (reviewing GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 2007)); Stephen B. Burbank,
The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1991); Linda Silberman, Transnational
Litigation: Is There a “Field”? A Tribute to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1427 (2006).
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the scope of prior litigation.237 No matter the source, litigation optionality implicates
substantive law values that may justify preclusion asymmetry, and courts must
consider these values when deciding how to respond to litigation options of any kind.
Furthermore, this Article’s attempt to supplement weak preclusion law with private
action also might be relevant to these other litigation options. Agreements to treat an
adjudication as binding present an alternative when preclusion law is unavailable or
unreliable, or when courts have imperfect information and limited tools.238 Here, as
elsewhere, procedural rules that recognize the realities of litigation and the different
capacities of courts and parties can better serve the underlying substantive law.

237. See supra Part II (collecting examples).
238. While transnational class actions typically involve plaintiff-side options, preclusion
uncertainty could exist on both sides of the “V.” In those cases, rather than one side paying
the other to exercise options, the parties could agree to mutual exercise—agreeing to be bound
by the first adjudication once and for all. Cf. Trammell, supra note 192, at 1245–68.

